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ABSTRACT
The common property nature of the Mississippi River Alluvial Aquifer (MRAA) results in
the formation of a cone of depression in the southern portion of the aquifer
encompassing Concordia parish, Louisiana. Excessive groundwater withdrawal and the
resulting cone of depression formation have caused some wells to go dry and others to
be affected by saltwater intrusion. The depleting groundwater stock can be managed
optimally using different groundwater management policies. The findings of this
dissertation are relevant to both policymakers and researchers to understand the effects
of policies to keep the aquifer sustainable.
My dissertation is written in a three-essay format. In the first essay, I summarize
the recent developments in the hydro-economic models that are used to evaluate the
groundwater management policies. A comprehensive overview of the recent literature
shows the need to take an interdisciplinary approach to overcome many hydrological,
economical, and institutional challenges. There is a need to focus on transboundary
groundwater management and the conjunctive use of surface and groundwater in the
hydro-economic modeling framework.
In the second essay, I estimate the profit gains resulting from the optimal
management under quota, well depth limit, and the combined quota and well depth limit
policies. I develop a hydro-economic model that accounts for both groundwater quality
and quantity tradeoffs. Results from the numerical dynamic optimization model show
that there is a profit gain under policy instruments.

x

Imposing a quota shows the tradeoffs between resilience and economic payoffs.
Combining a quota and well depth limit policy perform better than other policy
instruments when the aquifer has severe salinity.
In the third essay, I assess the potential economic impact of crop choice and
groundwater conservation. I develop a crop choice model where an individual farmer
has a crop planting or land fallowing choice each year. The main objective of the third
essay is to estimate the future returns from the irrigated land under the scenarios of
30%, 20%, 10%, 5%, and no groundwater conservation from 2020 to 2022. I find that
the profit of 2,572 farmers increased cumulatively by 0.14% when they conserve
groundwater by 30% for three years.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Agricultural production areas have been expanding globally to meet increased food and
energy demands (Poudel et al., 2012). Since irrigated land is more productive than dry
land, the extraction of groundwater and the diversion of surface water for irrigation have
been an increasing occurrence around the world (Rosegrant and Ringler, 2000; Cai et
al., 2003). It is more common for farmers to extract groundwater where it is available, as
surface water incurs, in some cases, a very high conveyance cost. Groundwater, a
reliable and sustainable source of freshwater, plays an important role in mitigating yield
loss due to a fluctuating pattern of precipitation and temperature. Globally, around 40%
of food comes from irrigated land, and almost 50% of global cereal cultivation is
irrigated with groundwater (Al et al., 2008; Wijnen et al., 2012). The agricultural sector
consumes almost 70% of the total groundwater extracted globally as well as in the U.S.
(Morris et al., 2003; USGS, 2019).
1.1. Consequences of Over Extraction
Groundwater extraction in a commonly held aquifer suffers from stock externality, both
spatially and temporally (Provencher and Burt, 1993). Depleting aquifer levels not only
increases the pumping cost but also deteriorates groundwater quality, hence causing
both pumping and environmental externalities (Roseta-Palma, 2002; 2003). Moreover,
over-extraction reduces well capacity and creates production externality (Manning and
Suter, 2019). Thus, over-extraction results in groundwater unavailability, higher
pumping cost, land subsidence, reduced well capacity, and saltwater intrusion (Bawden
et al., 2001; Morris et al., 2003; Post, 2005; Konikow, 2013; Sayre and Taraz, 2019;
Rad et al., 2020).
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1.1.1. Groundwater depletion: cases of the major aquifers across the globe
Groundwater depletion is a global problem across intensive agricultural production
regions such as north-western India, the North China Plain, the central USA, and
California (Wada et al., 2012; Famiglietti, 2014; Hackley, 2018). After the Second World
War, the development of improved pumping and center pivot irrigation technology
accelerated the use of groundwater (Sojka et al., 2002). Those technologies highly
impacted both the agricultural sector and the groundwater stock. Within different periods
in the High Plains aquifer (Ogallala Aquifer), estimated irrigated land coverage
continuously increased (McGuire, 2017). The advancement in irrigation technology
accompanied by over-extraction is responsible for the decline of the aquifer level. The
aquifer level declined by 15.8 feet on average in 2015 compared to the predevelopment
level, generally before 1950 (McGuire, 2017). In the southern region of the High Plains
aquifer, the cost of energy to pump groundwater is 10% of the total cost of production
(Dumler et al., 2010).
Elsewhere around the world, excessive withdrawal of groundwater is common.
The Indus River Plains Aquifer, which lies in Northwest India under the India-Pakistan
border, is one of the world’s most overexploited and declining aquifers (Wada et al.,
2010; United Nations Environment Programme and Global Environmental Alert Service,
2012). The growing population and high dependency on groundwater irrigation in the
region has depleted the aquifer (United Nations Environment Programme and Global
Environmental Alert Service, 2012). Between 2002 and 2008, the groundwater stock
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was exhausted at the rate of 0.33 meters per year (Rodell et al., 2009b). Subsidized
electricity for water extraction by farmers in India is the major reason for groundwater
overexploitation (Sayre and Taraz, 2019).
Similarly, in the North China Plain aquifer, after the introduction of cheaper and
more convenient diesel or electric-powered pumps, crop yield has dramatically
increased. The aquifer provides 70% of the total freshwater supply in the region (Liu et
al., 2011). With groundwater being more accessible due to technology, cropping
intensity changed from one crop per year to multiple crops per year (Qiu, 2010). Since
1964, the overexploitation lowered the groundwater depth by 20 meters (Foster and
Garduño, 2004). Thus, the loss in groundwater accessibility has threatened agricultural
productivity in the long-run and also increased the pumping cost.
1.1.2. Groundwater salinity
About 800 million hectares of the total land in the world is affected by salinity, a higher
portion of which, 34 million hectare, is irrigated land (FAO, 2011). Salinity resulting from
land use patterns, irrigation, drainage, and fertilization is the second-largest source of
land degradation (FAO, 2003). Some biophysical attributes of the aquifer and land
surfaces, such as soil structures and profile, slope, and average precipitation, affect the
level of salinity (Williams, 1999; Grundy et al., 2007). Soil salinity also gets accelerated
with high evapotranspiration and low precipitation in semi-arid and arid areas (Marlet
and Job, 2006).
Groundwater salinity, in both inland and coastal aquifers, occurs due to overextraction (Ferguson and Gleeson, 2012). The deteriorating groundwater quality lowers
farm profitability (Van Genuchten and Hoffman, 1984). It also reduces farmland value
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(Mukherjee and Schwabe, 2014). Land degradation due to salinity is a major issue in
arid and semi-arid regions, such as the Red River Basin of Texas and Oklahoma
(Laughlin and Lacewell, 1981; Bowen et al., 2015), the Upper Colorado River Basin
(Gardner and Young, 1988), in South-West Australia (John et al., 2005), and the
Murray-Darling River System in Australia (Quiggin, 1991).
Groundwater salinity reduces the productivity of the irrigated land. Based on the
salt-tolerant threshold level, crops are categorized as salt-tolerant or salt-sensitive
(Maas and Hoffman, 1977). Land use decisions of farmers in salinity affected areas are
influenced by the salinity tolerance level of the crops because the relative crop yield
reduction affects total farm revenue. Farmers benefit more if they change their planting
decisions based on salinity, soil type, and slope (MacEwan et al., 2016).
1.2. Mississippi River Alluvial Aquifer (MRAA)
The Mississippi Embayment Aquifer (MEA) system is extended over an area of 50
million acres from Illinois to the Gulf of Mexico and includes eight southern states
(Grubb, 1998; Konikow, 2013). The Mississippi River Valley Alluvial Aquifer (MRVAA)
lies at the uppermost of the MEA system that extends from Missouri-Kentucky to
Louisiana-Mississippi (Ackerman, 1996; Czarnecki et al., 2002). The Mississippi River
Alluvial Aquifer (MRAA) lies over the MRVAA and is formed from both the MEA and the
Coastal Lowland Aquifer System (Renken, 1998; Carlson, 2006). The MRAA is formed
from the Mississippi, Arkansas, and Ouachita Rivers. In Louisiana, it lies from central
Louisiana to the northeastern portion of the state and the borders of Arkansas (Carlson,
2006) (Figure 1.1).
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Figure 1.1. (a) Aquifers in Louisiana1. (b) MRAA study areas.

1

Source: http://www1.deq.louisiana.gov/portal/Portals/0/evaluation/aeps/la_aqui.gif
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A tertiary aquifer, the Claiborne aquifer, lies beneath the MRAA and is a major source of
dissolved solutes (Kresse and Clark, 2008). The MRAA water quality varies with depth
and location. The concentration of dissolved salt and hardiness of the water is higher at
the deeper levels (Whitfield, 1975; Welch and Hanor, 2011). The higher extraction rate
increases the probability of saltwater intrusion in the freshwater aquifer. For example, in
Franklin parish, the extraction volume was 15 times more in 2000 than in 1960 (Seanor
and Kress, 2004). It has also been noted that the salt concentration in the groundwater
ranges from 7.7 to 3170 mg/l (Whitfield, 1975). Therefore, the salinity concentration in
groundwater may go up due to unsustainable extraction.
My study is focused on ten northeast parishes of Louisiana: Avoyelles,
Catahoula, Concordia, East Carroll, Franklin, Madison, Morehouse, Richland, Tensas,
and West Carroll (Figure 1-1). The MRAA is the sole source of freshwater for
households, industries, and agriculture in these parishes. It is the second most used
aquifer in Louisiana and supplies around 385 Mgal/d, which is 22% of the overall
Louisiana extraction (Collier and Sargent, 2018). About 88% of the total MRAA supply is
allocated to the agricultural sector (Collier, 2018). The water budget for corn, cotton,
rice, soybean, wheat, and aquaculture was 338 mg/d in 2015 (Collier, 2018). Soybean
and corn are the two major water-intensive crops cultivated in this region. Around 81%
of Louisiana corn acres and 65% of Louisiana soybean acres were planted on land
overlying the MRAA in 2016 (FSA, 2019). The share of irrigated soybean and corn area
in the MRAA region is 126,474 acres and 141,180 acres, respectively (FSA, 2019).
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The Energy Policy Act of 2005 resulted in the corn and soybean production
areas’ expansion (Carter et al., 2016; Motamed et al., 2016). The area expansion
intensively used farm inputs, including groundwater. Water-intensive crop selection and
higher acreage allocation to irrigation maximize the short-run profit, but such behaviors
are likely to deplete the groundwater level in the long-run. Farmers’ decisions to adjust
production methods (increase water application) are effective against the yield loss due
to drought. However, the buffer value of the groundwater source decreases in the long
run with depleting stock. The shifting of crop cultivation to more water-intensive crops, in
the long run, invites vulnerability from drought. There are concerns from both the
extensive margin (expanding irrigation acreage) and the intensive margin (increasing
amount of irrigation applied to crops) on aquifer depletion (Hendricks and Peterson,
2012).
1.3. Research Motivation
Groundwater is an open-access2 resource and possesses non-rivalrous3; nonexcludability4; and subtractability5 characteristics (Madani and Dinar, 2012). The higher
rate of groundwater withdrawal is not surprising, because the common pool resource is
likely to be exploited in the absence of management policies or rules. The Tragedy of
Commons (Hardin, 1968) states that users of a common-pool resource maximize their
benefit by increasing resource withdrawal. When every user follows the same rationale,

2

Ignorant behavior of consumers leads to the wasteful exploitation of public goods.

3

When the good is consumed by one individual, another individual is not preempted from consuming it at
the same time.
4

A condition where excluding others from sharing in the benefits of a good’s consumption is not possible.

5

Extraction of groundwater by one user limits the availability of water to other users.
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the resource gets overexploited and cannot generate intergenerational benefits. The
extraction rate is higher because of the Common Pool Resource (CRP) dilemma; where
a user does not sacrifice her/his current private benefits to improve the long-term social
benefit (Ostrom et al., 1994; Madani, 2010; Ostrom, 2010). In the CRP dilemma, the
marginal unit of groundwater pumped by a user in the current year reduces the pumping
options to other individuals in future years. With the depleting groundwater stock,
pumping and environmental externalities also incur. The depleting groundwater stock
can be managed optimally under privatization, centrally managed government
regulations, or cooperative resource sharing (Ostrom, 1990) or by formulating proper
policies (Guilfoos et al., 2016). Though Gisser and Sanchez (1980) show that the
welfare difference between the nonintervention and socially optimal allocation would not
be significant, the growing groundwater literature shows the importance and contribution
of groundwater management policies to improve the economic life of an aquifer
(Guilfoos et al., 2016; Merrill and Guilfoos, 2017; Rad et al., 2020).
1.3.1. Objectives and contributions
In my dissertation, I focus on the sustainable management of groundwater in Louisiana
that would result in both internal and external benefits. Internal benefits can be achieved
by increasing land productivity through efficient water conservation irrigation technology.
The benefits for current non-users (or future users) can be considered as external
benefits that will be gained from better quality and adequate availability of water from
the MRAA. My dissertation has three objectives that are extended into three essays.
The major contributions of this dissertation are relevant to both policymakers and
academia.
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The first objective of my dissertation is to survey the recent development of
hydro-economic models to evaluate groundwater management policies for optimal
resource allocation and maximum welfare gain. I show the equal importance of both
hydrological and economic components in the hydro-economic modeling framework. I
present a comprehensive overview of how recent studies include policy evaluations in
aquifer modeling. I provide a tabular summary of policy instruments, the nature of the
aquifer, and major findings. This essay would contribute to identifying the direction of
future studies on hydro-economic models with the realization of aquifer characteristics,
economic behavior, and institutional rules.
The second objective of my dissertation is to evaluate the impacts of alternate
groundwater policies on farm profit, optimal extraction, and well life. MRAA is facing
both quality deterioration and quantity depletion problems due to over-extraction. I
develop a hydro-economic model that shows the economic and environmental tradeoff
considering both the quality and quantity aspects of management. I propose quota, well
depth limit, and combined quota and well depth limit as groundwater management
policy instruments. Generally, groundwater policies are effective if they are designed
considering the heterogeneous spatial characteristics of the aquifer. The developed
model could be applied to evaluate policies for the management of any confined aquifer
with quality and quantity concerns. The findings of this essay should inform
policymakers that the significant loss due to groundwater salinity can be reduced by the
proposed policy instruments.
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In the third essay of my dissertation, I assess the potential economic impacts of
crop mix and groundwater conservation in the MRAA. Farmers may not always choose
profit-maximizing crops, as several factors affect their crop mix choice. I use the vector
autoregressive (VAR) model to forecast energy and crop output prices. I include the
forecasted output price, location, and historical crop choice observations in the machine
learning tools to predict future crop choice. The MRAA groundwater model and energy
consumption model estimate the energy cost of the different crop mixes. Under different
groundwater conservation scenarios, farmers save both energy and water. This essay
contributes to the development of choice prediction models that incorporate the
environmental and economic aspects of farming. Predicting crop choices helps
policymakers explore flexible policies. The evaluation of conservation policy scenarios
before legislative actions may help in formulating appropriate strategies to minimize
economic damage in the targeted agricultural region.
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CHAPTER 2. A REVIEW ON OPTIMAL MANAGEMENT OF
GROUNDWATER AND HYDRO-ECONOMIC MODELING
2.1. Introduction
Technological progress specifically related to hydraulic engineering has made
groundwater extraction much easier and has helped to expand the irrigated agricultural
area, produce more food, provide potable water to a growing population, and increase
economic activities. Household consumption demand for around half of the world’s
population and 38% of agricultural demand is supplied by groundwater (Siebert et al.,
2010). The rapidly increasing use of groundwater with an expanding economy has
significantly increased groundwater withdrawal across the globe (Fornés et al., 2005;
Llamas and Martínez-Santos, 2005). Though groundwater withdrawal has provided an
unprecedented economic benefit, threats to aquifers persist. Groundwater depletion is a
global issue (Rodell et al., 2009a; Famiglietti et al., 2011; Wada et al., 2012; Richey et
al., 2015). Therefore, research on improved groundwater management is a call of this
decade. In reviewing the existing literature on groundwater management policies, my
objectives are to provide a comprehensive overview of the recent literature related to
groundwater management policies and hydro-economic modeling. I identify the direction
of future studies where researchers can contribute.
The impact of over-extraction is generally observed directly on the pumping cost
(Provencher and Burt, 1993), as well as in the long -term irreversible impacts such as
land subsidence, streamflow depletion, salt intrusion, and wetlands and ecological
impairments (Konikow and Kendy, 2005). Anthropogenic activities are major threats to
groundwater quality (Khan et al., 2016; MacDonald et al., 2016; Ashraf et al., 2017) that
reduce the economic value of groundwater use. Both quality and quantity issues of
11

groundwater are interdependent (Roseta-Palma, 2003; Jang et al., 2012; Kamali and
Niksokhan, 2017). Higher extraction may reduce the groundwater head, and the
pollutants may intrude the freshwater aquifer because of the groundwater head drop
(Katic and Grafton, 2011). Or, with the increasing probability of pollutant intrusion, users
may extract more as the resource has lower or no future benefits (Poudel and Paudel,
2018).
The water economy is shifting from an expansionary6 water economy to a
mature7 water economy (Randall, 1981; Quiggin, 2001; Booker et al., 2012). In a
mature economy, the reallocation of water based on relative use-value would be more
efficient. The groundwater system is a complex, heterogeneous, and open system
where the assumptions of aquifer characteristics for policy formulation may vary highly
from reality. The reliability of decision-making is heavily weighted on the difference
between observed response and management action and a piece of profound
knowledge of the groundwater system. In natural resource management, misleading
information regarding resource behaviors in decision making can destroy or destabilize
a system (Anderies et al., 2007). Knowledge of groundwater is not limited to its physical
properties. It is an interdisciplinary subject that has interdependencies with socioeconomic and institutional systems.

6The

benefit from new water supply development is greater than the cost associated with the
development
7

The cost of new water supply development is higher than the benefit.

12

Hydrological and socio-economic interaction is framed by economic and
hydrological tools that are commonly used to assess the impacts of groundwater policy
in hydrological and welfare settings. Moreover, the role of economics for the analysis of
groundwater policy, in recent literature, is not limited to the benefit-cost analysis of the
water supply development project. It has morphed to the optimal allocation of the
resource among multiple users from multiple water sources over multiple years.
Water management policies require an understanding of the economic value of
water and the consequences of those policies on hydrological characteristics and
welfare gains. The recent economic modeling literature has been spurred by resource
valuation for any specific use, the net economic benefit evaluation of water supply, and
infrastructure investment. Moreover, literature on the mature water economy is mainly
focused on allocation optimization and welfare distribution in temporal and spatial
contexts.
With this aim, section 2.2 provides a brief overview of the demand for water
followed by a review on the assessment of water management including policy
instruments such as water pricing, limit and restriction, permits, and electricity pricing in
the hydro-economic framework in section 2.3. Finally, section 2.4 provides the
discussion, future direction, and concluding remarks.
2.2. Demand for Water
A resource possesses an economic value when users are willing to pay a price to use
that resource. Economists are developing and improving models that explain the
economic demand for water by including the users’ behavioral aspects. Water demand
is both direct, which is mostly for food and drinking, and indirect, for food production.
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There are various methods to estimate the economic demand for water. Such models
address the particular attributes and allocative approaches for heterogeneous water
users. The demand for the public good is estimated with the willingness to pay (WTP) or
willingness to accept (WTA) approach. In the conceptual context of the competitive
market, there would be a set of prices corresponding to the resource use such that it
would be consistent with the preferences and the objective of producers and
consumers. The perfectly competitive market for the water resource is very rare,
because it has high exclusion costs and free ridership issues (Booker et al., 2012;
Koundouri et al., 2017). Therefore, the enforcement of rules, regulations, and policies
for the efficient allocation of water among the users are generally in practice (Famiglietti,
2014).
Private goods can be further classified into producers’ goods and consumers’
goods. Producers’ goods are used to make other products, for example, water applied
in irrigation is used to produce food. However, consumers’ goods are directly consumed
by consumers. The concept of private goods is useful for modeling water economic
policies. Water uses in agriculture for irrigation are significantly more than other
producers’ uses. The use is even higher in the arid and semi-arid regions across the
globe.
2.2.1. Water demand estimation approaches
2.2.1.1. Mathematical programming
In the framework of linear programming optimization models, the inverse demand
function of water can be estimated with a different set of hypothesized water price levels
to maximize farm revenue (Moore and Hedges, 1963). The mathematical programming
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(MP) approach, a residual valuation technique, is used to derive the demand (derived
demand) for water by estimating the residual scarcity rents8 of the water resources
(Moore and Hedges, 1963; Booker, 1995; Medellín-Azuara et al., 2009; Booker et al.,
2012). However, the MP approach invites some debatable issues on the estimation of
welfare change, consistency in the long-run and short-run estimates, and appropriate
pricing of other agricultural inputs. Modifications on MP models have been realized for
addressing water and acreage allocation under the profitable crops, encompassing
producers’ choice for different crops and water application rates with alternative
irrigation technologies (Mérel and Howitt, 2014; Najafabadi et al., 2019). Costs assigned
to some major inputs in the MP models, such as land, capital, and labor, create an issue
on return estimation. Those costs are considered fixed in the temporal setting.
Moreover, the return estimation is based on the results from the management decision
rather than from the prediction of input prices.
The positive MP model, a self-calibrating model, can overcome the price
allocation problem (Cortignani and Severini, 2009). It has a three step procedure. In the
first step, it uses linear programming to solve the maximization of the net return. The
second step is to derive parameters for the quadratic cost function by the Lagrange
multiplier. In the third step, it iteratively includes the functions calibrated in the first and
second steps to the nonlinear maximization function. The economic demand function for
water is estimated by solving iteratively on alternative management restrictions
(Alamdarlo et al., 2019).

8

Scarcity rents are the anticipated higher cost for water use in the foreseeable future compared to the
present cheaper cost (Pollock, 1988).
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2.2.1.2. Field experiments
Inductive modeling approaches to determine the water demand function, such as field
experiments and econometric methods are also prominent in the literature. Field
experiments conducted at the farm level establish a relationship between crop yield and
water application in the form of a polynomial production function. The demand function
for water can be generated from the marginal product function. However, the literature
on experimental studies is very limited (Hillel and Guron, 1973; Zhang and Oweis, 1999;
Al-Jamal et al., 2000; Dağdelen et al., 2006). A study conducted in one region may not
represent other regions. Simulation models developed with a wide range of
experimental data may reflect reality to some extent. Therefore those methods are
generally used to estimate the demand for inputs (Nearing et al., 2012; Hu et al., 2019).
2.2.1.3. Econometric methods
The econometric approach uses data from farm level surveys, the government, and
private agencies. Earlier econometric studies to estimate water demand as a function of
output prices, input prices, and quantities of fixed factors were conducted by Frank and
Beattie (1979) and Nieswiadomy (1985). The economic demand for water function can
be used to appraise different policy scenarios. Hendricks and Peterson (2012) use the
water demand function to estimate the cost of reducing the application of water for
irrigation through different policy scenarios such as water pricing, irrigation restriction,
and intensity-reduction programs.
Relative change in water demand for a given set of prices is given by price
elasticity. As the price per unit of water increases, water demand decreases. Demand
elasticity may be useful for allocating water resources to other users. Hence, price

16

elasticity for water demand can be used to assess the economic feasibility of water
allocation among inter or intra water users. There are limited empirical studies on the
impact of price on water demand in the agricultural sector due to a lack of water trade
data, the unavailability of water price information, and trade on water entitlement despite
temporary and seasonal trends (Hendricks and Peterson, 2012; Pfeiffer and Lin, 2014b;
Mieno and Brozović, 2017).
2.3. Hydro-economic Model
The complex relation between water and the economy can be explained with hydroeconomic models. Hydro-economic models should connect the hydrological
characteristics to the economic law of demand and supply for water. Many hydroeconomic models are focused on agriculture because agriculture is the most waterconsuming sector in the world. Demand for water in agriculture is based on agronomic
characteristics, water-yield relation, soil type, weather, irrigated area, and irrigation
system. Since the aquifer is the source of supply, the water demand is directly linked
with the aquifers’ quality and quantity. There is a tradeoff between economic behavior
and hydrological attributes. In a process of transferring water for economic use, the
physical attributes of the aquifer may get disturbed (Katic and Grafton, 2011). In hydroeconomic modeling, the economic activity is realized with the objective function; that
could be either cost minimization or profit maximization. Total revenue and total cost,
including variable and fixed costs, are subject to natural resource constraints such as
land acreage or water stock, or water level. Generally, most of the hydro-economic
models are based on the algorithm for economic optimization subject to the hydrological
constraints that reflect the stock availability or water quality.
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For the unconfined multi-cell connected aquifer, groundwater height is based on
the Darcy Law (Guilfoos et al., 2016) shown as:
𝑗

ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1 − ℎ𝑖,𝑡

(1 − 𝛼)𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 − ℎ𝑗𝑡 )
𝑅𝑖𝑡
=
− ∑[
]−
𝐴𝑖 𝑆
𝑑𝑖𝑗 𝐴𝑖 𝑆
𝐴𝑖 𝑆

(2 − 1)

𝑗≠𝑖

where ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the groundwater height for the well 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the natural recharge,
which would be essentially zero in the case of the confined aquifer; 𝐴𝑖 is the surface
area of the irrigated land above the aquifer; 𝑆 is the specific yield; 𝐾𝑖 represents the
hydraulic conductivity that is time-invariant; 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the cross-sectional area where the
water from one cell flows to another cell; 𝛼 defines the proportion of applied water, 𝑊𝑖𝑡 ,
that percolates into the aquifer; 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the distance between the adjacent cells.
In the case of a single-cell bathtub model, the groundwater head is given as
(Koundouri et al., 2017)
ℎ𝑡+1 − ℎ𝑡 =

𝑅𝑡 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑊𝑡
𝐴𝑆

(2 − 2)

The groundwater height increases with higher recharge and percolation.
Crop yield, 𝑦𝑡 , is affected by the amount of water demand, 𝑓(𝑊𝑡 ), for irrigation and
environmental constraints such as saltwater intrusion, g(𝐸𝑡 ), in groundwater, where 𝐸𝑡 is
the salt concentration. The formulation is given as:
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑊𝑡 ) × g(𝐸𝑡 )

(2 − 3)

where 0 ≤ 𝑓(𝑊𝑡 ) and g(𝐸𝑡 ) ≤ 1. The environmental constraint g(𝐸𝑡 ) would be 1 if there
is no environmental issue. With the given amount of crop price, input costs (including
the pumping cost), and crop yield, per unit area profit can be estimated as:
𝜋𝑡 (ℎ𝑡 , 𝑊𝑡 ) = 𝑝 ∙ 𝐴 ∙ 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑐𝑊𝑡 (𝑙 − ℎ𝑡 ) − 𝛿
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(2 − 4)

where 𝑝 is the output price of a crop, 𝑐 is the cost required to pump one cubic meter of
water from one-meter depth, 𝑙 is the ground elevation, and 𝛿 is the other input cost.
Comprising the hydrologic and economic models with appropriate discount factor 𝛽, the
hydro-economic model is such as:
𝑇

max [∑ 𝛽 𝑡 𝜋𝑡 (ℎ𝑡 , 𝑊𝑡 )]
𝑊𝑡

(2 − 5)

𝑡

subject to either equation (2-1) or (2-2).
The amount of water extraction is reflected in the groundwater height, which is a
representation of the groundwater stock. There is a tradeoff between economic
behavior and aquifer characteristics. If farmers want to expand the irrigated area or
extract more water to harvest a higher profit, then the groundwater height decreases
and pumping cost incurs. In the simple profit function equation (2-4), the profit would be
higher when the pumping cost and loss from environmental stress such as salinity are
low.
The supply of water resources is another important aspect of water policy
modeling. In a mature water economy, the demand may exceed the supply. Such a
scenario leads to the optimization of groundwater management over time addressing
the tradeoffs among multiple objectives. Hydro-economic models also provide insight
into the adequacy of the supply source under water stress invited by multiple factors
including climatic change. The recent modeling framework of the dynamic optimization
of a groundwater source has advanced from a single-cell bathtub to interlinked multicells (Brozović et al., 2010; Guilfoos et al., 2016) to multiple bathtubs (Kovacs and
Durand‐Morat, 2020). In most parts of the world, supply management through
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conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water is also practiced, which is well
formulated in the hydro-economic modeling framework (Parsapour-Moghaddam et al.,
2015; Milan et al., 2018).
The hydro-economic models integrate the demand and supply aspects, include
the environmental values, and incorporate the regulations or policies (Booker et al.,
2012; Koundouri et al., 2017). There are recent advances in the numerical optimization
algorithm and high performing computers to reduce the computational burden (Elshall et
al., 2020). The computational effort to incorporate the economic and hydrological
concepts into a model was first proposed by Maass et al. (1962). McKinnet et al. (1999)
compared the approaches used in the hydrological model with the economic model.
Hydrological models consider days or months or seasons to define time. For
geographical demarcation, such models use watersheds, basins, or aquifer region.
Moreover, hydrological models are based on simulation techniques. Whereas, the
economic models generally consider a year or multiple years for the temporal
specification. Districts, counties, states, and countries are the spatial units mostly used
in the economic models. In addition, economic models are based on optimization tools.
2.3.1. Water management policies
Water management strategies can affect both the demand and supply of water. They
may reduce the demand from a particular user and allocate the saved resource to the
other users. However, the benefits from saved water must be higher than the costs
incurred in the management measures. Commonly used policy instruments for
managing groundwater are i) limit or restriction on groundwater use; ii) economic
instruments such as a water market, charges, water pricing, tariffs, and cost-share and
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insurance for irrigation infrastructure; and iii) reliable information and cooperative
agreements. The assessment and development of groundwater management policies
are evaluated in the hydro-economic modeling framework (Table 2.1).
Unlike the Gisser-Sanchez effect (Gisser and Sanchez, 1980), resource use
under regulation has long-term benefits compared to the exploitation under the
unregulated case (Brozović et al., 2010; Hrozencik et al., 2017; Ghadimi and Ketabchi,
2019). The prevailing view in groundwater literature is centered on the importance of
management policies to internalize the extraction and environmental externalities. The
present value of cost for not using water resources is lower than the present value of
the future benefit under efficient groundwater management. Efficient policy
management ensures the availability of resources in the future. The cost and benefit of
groundwater policies with optimal extraction paths are evaluated by hydro-economic
models (Harou et al., 2009). Aquifer characteristics, economic behavior, and institutional
rules are cognizant of the hydro-economic model.
The spatial allocation of groundwater within an aquifer region may cause variations in
welfare gain and resource use (Brozović et al., 2010; Guilfoos et al., 2013; Mulligan et
al., 2014; Ghadimi and Ketabchi, 2019). The misspecification of hydrological
components (aquifer characteristics) in the hydro-economic model may result in an
underestimation or overestimation of optimal welfare gains. Like Gisser and Sanchez
(1980), other studies in the past (Feinerman and Knapp, 1983; Burness and Brill, 2001)
consider uniform aquifer characteristics such as uniform groundwater head, hydraulic
conductivity, constant recharge, and a bottom-less aquifer across the entire aquifer
region that may not reflect the reality. Brozović et al. (2010) show that the single-cell
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modeling of a larger aquifer disregards the spatial heterogeneity and misleads regarding
policy implications. Athanassoglou et al. (2012) analyze the modeling assumption of the
multi-cell aquifer. The simulation result of the interconnected multiple cells shows that
policies formulated on the basis of single-cell assumption, without considering spatial
heterogeneity of the aquifer, have adverse welfare impact.
Kuwayama and Brozović (2013) consider spatial heterogeneity in their hydroeconomic model to estimate the impacts of tradeable groundwater permits on
compliance cost and the marginal damage cost to streamflow in the Republican River
Basin, Nebraska. They collect the economic, agronomic, hydrologic, and climate data
from different sources and employ the dynamic optimization method to solve for the
steady-state permit market. They compare the spatially distributed permit mechanism
with the spatially uniform permit and find that the regulator would save more cost in a
spatially distributed permit. A groundwater pump nearby the stream would have an
immediate and significant impact on the streamflow compared to when the pumping
location is far away from the stream. Therefore, the permit distribution mechanism,
spatially, in this study is reasonable.
Endogenous and exogenous risks affect the optimal extraction path of
groundwater. de Frutos Cachorro et al. (2014) study the effects of information to
recharge shock (exogenous reversible risk) on the optimal management of the
groundwater resource. The hydrological parameters, which are the outputs of the
groundwater model, are used as inputs in the optimization model to observe the
behavior of farmers lying above the Western la Mancha aquifer, Spain. They find that
when the information is known, both resource extraction and social welfare increases in
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Table 2.1. Groundwater policy instruments or conservation strategies in hydro-economic modeling framework to improve
the groundwater stress.
Literature
Objective
Policy
Nature of aquifer
Model
Major findings
instruments/
strategies
Kuwayama
To analyze the
-Spatially
-Location: Ogallala
-Optimization - Regulators obtain
and Brozović impacts of
distributed permit
Aquifer, Nebraska
more saving (lower
(2013)
spatially
-Spatially uniform
farmers abatement
(Journal of
distributed permit
permit
-Major users:
cost and marginal
Environment mechanism on the
Agriculture
damage cost to the
al Economics farmer abatement
stream) if the permit is
and
cost and marginal
-Number of wells:
distributed spatially
Management damage cost to
10,098
)
the spring
de Frutos
Cachorro et
al. (2014)
(Journal of
Economic
Dynamics &
Control)
Guilfoos et
al. (2016)
(Land
Economics)

To examine the
impacts of
recharge shock
information on
groundwater
resource and
social welfare

To evaluate the
relative
performances of
different water
management
policies in a
spatially
heterogeneous
aquifer
Table 2.1. cont’d.

-Prior information
on recharge shock

-Temporally flat
tax rate,
-Temporally
variable tax rate,
-Quantity
restriction,
-Static water
markets, and

-Unconfined

-Simulation

-Location: Western
la Mancha aquifer,
Spain

-Optimization

-Major users:
Agriculture
-Location: Ogallala
Aquifer, northwest
Kansas
-Major users:
Agriculture
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-Simulation
-fixed effects
model
(Ordinary
Least
Squares)

-Optimal extraction
follows a nonmonotonic pattern
-Social loss is higher
when prior information
on the shock is not
available
-Localized policy
performs better than
the uniform policy
across the aquifer
region

Literature

Objective

Hrozencik et
al. (2017)
(Water
Resources
Research)

To assess the
impact of
management
policies on
heterogeneous
producers
considering well
capacity, the
productivity of
water, and
weather
uncertainty in the
hydro-economic
model
To evaluate the
cost and benefit of
groundwater
management with
monitored water
quantity

Zekri et al.
(2017)
(Agricultural
Water
Management
)

Policy
instruments/
strategies
-Local area
management
where a portion of
the aquifer is
managed with
water price and
quantity restriction
-Pumping fee,
-Extraction
restriction, and
-An irrigated
acreage fee

Nature of aquifer

Model

Major findings

-Confined

-Simulation

-Location: High
Plain aquifer,
eastern Colorado

-Ordinary
Least
Squares

-Well capacity and soil
type significantly affect
the impacts of all
management policies.

-Major users:
Agriculture
-Number of wells:
3006

-Quantity control
as a result of
smart water
meters

-Coastal aquifer

-Simulation

-Location: Batinah,
Oman

-Optimization

-Major users:
Agriculture

Table 2.1. cont’d.
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-Private optimality
force 46% of irrigable
land out of the market

Literature

Ghadimi and
Ketabchi
(2019)
(Journal of
Hydrology)

Tran et al.
(2019)
(Journal of
Hydrology)

Objective

To assess the
impact of
cooperation
among users
considering the
internalization of
extraction and
environmental
externality on
aquifer
management

Policy
instruments/
strategies

-Cooperative
management

To study the
-Water banking
interaction of
managed aquifer
recharge (MAR),
crop choice,
groundwater
conservation
policies, and
surface irrigation
sources to
optimize economic
returns
Table 2.1. cont’d.

Nature of aquifer

-Alluvial aquifer
-Location: North of
the TashkBakhtegan basin,
Iran

Model

-Simulation
-Optimization
model
-Cooperative
game theory

-Location: Eastern
Arkansas
-Major users:
Agriculture
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-Social optimality
(water extraction limit)
results in the potential
benefit of $790 million
- Cooperation
increased the net
benefit by 20.5%
without internalization.
-Internalizing both
externalities would
increase the
cooperative net benefit
by 3% to 14%

-Major users:
Agriculture
-Number of wells:
1630
-Mississippi River
Alluvial Aquifer

Major findings

-Simulation
-Optimization

-MAR is not effective if
the cost of MAR is
more than $40 per
acre-foot of water

Literature

Objective

Sayre and
Taraz (2019)
(Journal of
Environment
al Economics
and
Management
)

To compare the
optimal
management
scenario with the

Afshar et al.
(2020)
(Water
Resources
Management
)

Policy
instruments/
strategies
-The full marginal
cost of electricity
pricing

common pool
regime

To evaluate the
economic impacts
of optimized
cropping pattern,
amount and timing
of groundwater
extraction, and
energy
consumption on
the sustaining
groundwater
height
Rad et al.
To evaluate the
(2020)
impacts of
(Resource
different
and Energy
management
Economics)
policies aiming at
Table 2.1. cont’d.

Nature of aquifer

Model

Major findings

-Alluvial aquifer

-Simulation

-The net present value
of welfare gains in
optimal management
compared to the
common pool regime
increased by 66% and
23% in uniform
electricity pricing and
marginal cost
electricity pricing,
respectively.
-The optimal strategy
reduces the farm profit
by 20% as a cost of
maintaining the
sustaining
groundwater height
goes up

-Location: Northwest -Optimization
India
-Major users:
Agriculture

-Not given

-Location: Ishafan,
Iran
-Major users:
Agriculture

-Water use quota,

-High Plain Aquifer,
Southeast Nebraska

-Pumping tax, and
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-Simulation

-Pumping tax is more
effective where well
capacity is higher.

Literature

Objective

reducing
groundwater
height given the
spatially
heterogeneous
well capacity

Policy
instruments/
strategies
-Per irrigation
acreage tax

Nature of aquifer

-Major users:
Agriculture
-Number of wells:
3200

Model

Major findings

-Acreage tax performs
better when the well
capacity ranges from
low to intermediate.
-Tax and quota have
uniform costeffectiveness but the
spatial distribution of
cost and benefit
among farmers are
different
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the short-run, before the event happens. In the long-run, resource extraction and social
welfare decrease. The resource manager’s gain in the short run incurs long-run loss. An
increase in uncertainty results in intensive resource exploitation in the short run and
precautionary extraction in the long run. The value of information significantly impacts
the welfare gain. In a particular example, the authors show that the total welfare loss for
not having information on the shock is 47 million Euros in the study area. This study
provides insight into the value of information to uncertainty. However, the authors
consider the recharge rate (shock) fixed over the study period. Indeed, they consider
the time of the event happening as the random factor. Considering the dynamics of the
recharge rate would have given a better representation of welfare estimates.
Guilfoos et al. (2016) develop a hydrological model for the Ogallala Aquifer with
8,457 grids. Each grid may have different hydrological characteristics; thus, the authors
consider the spatial variation in the aquifer. There are 2,088 farmers in the study region,
and they are a subset of the number of grids. The authors get the hydrological data from
the Kansas Water Office. They derive the water demand function from the OLS method
applied to the field level panel data following Hendricks and Peterson (2012). With the
hydro-economic model set up, the objective of their study is to analyze the impact of
groundwater management policies on spatially distributed net benefits in northeast
Kansas. The policies are (i) a tax rate that is uniform spatially and temporally, (ii) a tax
rate that is uniform spatially but varies temporally, (iii) water market, (iv) quantity
restriction, and (v) the local management policy of tax and quantity restriction. The
parameter for water demand obtained from the econometric model is used as the input
in the groundwater simulation model. The hydro-economic model shows that the
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spatially uniform groundwater policy performs poorly compared to the localized
management policy. Policy implications in the most sensitive region of the aquifer may
perform better than the policy implied for the whole aquifer region including the
groundwater abundant region. Guilfoos et al. (2016) lack the crop choice and irrigation
technology specification in their hydro-economic model. Spatial heterogeneity in the
agricultural land and irrigation technology lying over the aquifer is important, because
total water demand depends on irrigation technology and crop choice. In addition, the
capacity of the well may not be constant over time, which is not explained by the hydroeconomic model. Over-extraction reduces groundwater height and ultimately incurs
pumping costs. However, on the irrigated land, the additional cost would be from lower
well yield. Depending upon the hydrological parameters, such as hydraulic conductivity,
specific yield, specific storage, and porosity, the supply of the aquifer can be limited.
Agricultural production and well capacity are incorporated in the hydro-economic
model developed by Hrozencik et al. (2017). The authors evaluate the effects of
temporally and spatially heterogeneous aquifer behavior and crop choice on the aquifer
management policy. The economic activities of farmers are determined by the well yield
and the depth of the groundwater. The authors center on three groundwater
management policies: water pricing, quantity restriction, and an irrigated acreage fee.
The economic variables such as crop price and input costs and crop-water production
function obtained from the agronomic model are used in the groundwater simulation
model to examine the dynamic impact of the farming decision on aquifer characteristics.

29

They find that excluding well capacity and soil characteristics, which vary spatially,
misleads regarding the impacts of management policies, thus; impacting the decisionmaking process.
Rad et al. (2020) included weather variability in their hydro-economic model to
evaluate the impacts of policy management aiming to reduce groundwater extraction in
the High Plain Aquifer, Nebraska. Weather uncertainty defines the extensive and
intensive margin of groundwater. During drier weather, farmers with a higher well
capacity increase water use, whereas with a lower well capacity they will reduce
irrigated acreage. Their results show that tax policy performs better in regions where the
well capacity is higher. For the lower to intermediate well capacity areas, an occupation
tax9 is effective. Water quota and tax rate have the same cost-effectiveness but the
distribution of cost and benefits among farmers is different across the aquifer region.
Thus, this study shows how farmers’ production decisions change with changing supply
sources and how policies play a role in reducing extraction given the capacity of supply.
Zekri et al. (2017) evaluate the impacts of smart water meters on crop acreage
and farm benefit over a 70 years horizon. Seawater intrusion is a major problem in the
study area, the Batinah region, Oman. Farmers get a subsidy on electricity, so the
pumping cost would be insignificant in reducing groundwater use. Moreover,
groundwater depth reduction is not an issue in the study region. A pilot survey provides
cost information on smart water meters and the institutional monitoring of water use.
Dynamic optimization and simulation models are used to assess the impact of private
and social optimality. Without government intervention, they find that the lower water

9

Occupational tax: taxing per acre of irrigated land
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quality reduces the total crop acreage by 45% over the 70-year study horizon. With the
institutionally controlled water amount, a 10% reduction in the cropped area is
observed. The net present value of the potential benefit toward the end of the 70 years
with a 7% discount rate is $790 million, though 42% of the farmers, mostly those closer
to the beach area, are forced to exit farming. This study gives the future perspective of
transforming agricultural land into urban planning near the recreational area, because
agricultural production would incur a loss in the future due to the groundwater quality.
In an intensive agricultural zone, the water level mostly goes down in the
cropping season. Tran et al. (2019) examine the storage of excess surface water in the
aquifer. Surface water in the non-farming season can be managed through one of the
conjunctive approaches, Managed Aquifer Recharge (MAR). Their study evaluates the
interaction of crop choice, MAR, surface reservoir, and groundwater conservation
policies to optimize economic returns. They use the outcome of the simulated
groundwater model as an input in the optimization model. Their results on the optimal
economic use of water for MAR show that the higher cost of MAR cannot increase
groundwater height. The cost of MAR water should be less than half of the pumping
cost to increase groundwater stock or groundwater height. There would be a slippage
effect because of MAR. Farmers may allocate more area for irrigation or cultivate more
water demanding crops. They conclude that MAR would be effective with the
conjunctive use of MAR water and surface water storage and groundwater conservation
policies such as quota or fee per volume of extraction.
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Electricity is a major input in groundwater irrigation. In India, the flat electricity
price is one of the main reasons for groundwater depletion (Badiani et al., 2012). Sayre
and Taraz (2019) set the optimality condition where both groundwater and well
investment are managed optimally. They compare the impact of a flat electricity price
and a marginal electricity price on the welfare gain from optimal management and
common pool scenarios. Numerical simulation shows the welfare loss due to better and
deeper wells and the resulting higher extraction rate. With uniform electricity pricing,
farmers would gain 66% more benefits in optimal management. However, the benefit is
23% if marginal electricity pricing is considered. In flat electricity prices, farmers do not
pay the increased marginal energy cost as a result of groundwater depletion. However,
production loss could incur due to lower well capacity as the water level declines in the
future. Farmers may get the previous extraction level if they invest in well improvement.
Unlike Badiani-Magnusson and Jessoe (2018)’s finding in the static framework that the
deadweight loss would be minimal with an electricity price subsidy, Sayre and Taraz
(2019) finds that the pumping cost externality increases with well improvement. In the
case of a higher well improvement cost than the benefit, farmers would shift cultivation
to dryland cropping or they would exit farming.
There is a tradeoff between the long term net revenue and acceptable
groundwater height. Afshar et al. (2020) use a groundwater simulation model which is
coupled with the multi-objective optimization of cropping pattern, amount and timing for
groundwater use, and energy consumption to reduce groundwater height. The Pareto
surface of three objectives shows the tradeoff between different objectives. Reducing
groundwater extraction reduces agricultural profits and energy consumption but it
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increases groundwater height. The optimal strategy reduces 20% of the profit to get a
sustaining groundwater height. With no change in energy cost, the profit is reduced by
17%. This study highlights the importance of government subsidies on electricity. The
major drawback of this study lies in the assumption of the aquifer characteristics. The
authors assume the aquifer as a bath-tub cell, whereas in reality the nature of the
aquifer could be interconnected multi-cell or multiple bath-tub cells. Hence, this study
lacks the spatial heterogeneity of cropping patterns and groundwater height that might
have underestimated or overestimated the welfare.
Esteban and Dinar (2013) studied the cooperative management of water
resources in an empirical game theory framework. Ghadimi and Ketabchi (2019) follow
the empirical model of Esteban and Dinar (2013) with some modifications. They use the
simulation-optimization model and Continuous Ant Colony Optimization (CACO)
algorithm for optimum use of decision variables (land and water) to evaluate the net
present value of future benefits under different cooperative scenarios, including the
internalization of externalities. They differentiate an aquifer into three regions. The
cooperative scenarios among those three regions are no cooperation, partial
cooperation, and full cooperation. Over-extraction of one region may impact the water
availability of the other two regions; this is known as extraction externality. Moreover,
over withdrawal also aggravates the groundwater linked ecosystem; this is called
environmental externality. Their hydro-economic model shows that, in full cooperation,
farmers would increase their net benefit by 20.5%. They may get an additional 3% to
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14% benefit if they fully cooperate and internalize environmental and extraction
externalities. Moreover, the height of the aquifer rises by 4.8 meters and the annual
depletion reduces by 14 million cubic meters within 30 years of the planning horizon.
2.4. Conclusion and Future Direction
The demand for groundwater is increasing to support a growing population. Both
extensive and intensive marginal effects of the farming decision are reducing
groundwater stock. Moreover, climate change has intensified the withdrawal of
groundwater in the agricultural sector (Thomas and Famiglietti, 2019). Confined aquifers
have limited recharge except in the outcrop area or that connected with local streams or
rivers. Even in the case of unconfined aquifers, an extraction rate higher than the
recharge rate imperils its sustainable use (Richey et al., 2015). Increasing water
demand with limited availability, and increasing cost for supply infrastructures combined
with the environmental concern for water quality and water value is shaping the intense
competition for existing water resources.
Sustainable use of resources ensures that the current exploitation of resources
does not impact the economic, environmental, and social values of those resources in
the future. Since groundwater is a common-pool resource, management policies are
necessary to meet the specific goals to sustain the resources for future use. Effective
groundwater management policies may reduce the increasing demand for groundwater
to a managed level or at a steady state level. Those policies should realize groundwater
as a system and understand the social, environmental, economic, and cultural aspects
of the system for a defined consensus or sustainable yield (Alley and Leake, 2004;
Pierce et al., 2013).
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Different water policy instruments such as water pricing, permits, quantity limit,
quantity restriction, and energy pricing are commonly used to efficiently allocate water
resources considering the spatial heterogeneity of the aquifer. Uniform policy across the
aquifer region may uniformly distribute the benefits to producers. However, as shown by
Guilfoos et al. (2016), the distribution of welfare gains among farmers varies spatially,
and locally managed policy performs better than uniform policy.
Moreover, policy instruments implemented based on the spatial heterogeneity of the
aquifer can also improve the groundwater-based ecosystem by reducing or managing
pumping in the sensitive zone of the aquifer.
The holistic modeling approach for developing and assessing the impact of
groundwater management policy considers economic, hydrologic, and institutional
aspects in the framework. The aquifers’ characteristics, other than single-cell, such as
interlinked multi-cells or multiple bathtub, are realized in the recently developed hydroeconomic models. With the advancement in defining the supply source of groundwater,
the impacts of proposed management policies on temporal and spatial variation in
groundwater availability and farm profitability are well specified. Most of the developing
countries are in a water expansion economy, with population and industrial activities
increasing. The recent improvement of the hydro-economic model and its use in
assessing the effectiveness of policy instruments would help developing economies with
proper management of groundwater resources. Though the coupled hydro-economic
model accounts for the benefits to individual wells/users in a profit-maximizing
framework, it may underestimate the true benefit of preserving public goods like
groundwater resources.
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The hydro-economic model cannot ignore the challenges it may bear in its
hydrological and economic components. The nature and structure of the aquifer,
recharge rate, inter-connection of the aquifer with surface water, the actual groundwater
stocks, and water transmissivity are some hydrological criteria that pose challenges in
managing the invisible water source. Similarly, estimation of water demand,
identification of future cropping patterns, future input prices, cropping area, soil
characteristics, evapotranspiration, and risk and uncertainties in the production process
are economic and agronomic challenges. Changes in economic behaviors of
groundwater users to manage the groundwater resource for efficient spatial and
temporal allocation is open to contention.
Economic, hydrologic, agronomic, and climatic challenges have set the need for
a multi-disciplinary team and collaboration with the stakeholders. Reliable data are
needed to develop an accurate hydro-economic model. To capture the spatial
heterogeneity in the model, variation of cropping pattern, water application rate,
temperature, and precipitation is also important. An important area of future research on
groundwater management in the agricultural zone would be to conduct the field
experiment at different locations to estimate the water-yield relationship. As water
application is the decision variable in the optimization problem, such experiments depict
the crop yield and water relation, incorporating climatic factors that vary spatially.
Moreover, farmers may adapt to different stressors, so the adjustment to agricultural
activities should be considered in the modeling effort.
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Providing more detailed insights into the aquifer’s characteristics would be
another future research direction. Development and improvement of hydro-economic
models for transboundary management of groundwater and conjunctive use of surface
water and groundwater are potential areas for future research. The policy assessment
of groundwater management over the spatially heterogeneous aquifer should be more
detailed and comprehensive. As uniform policy may not be as beneficial compared to
locally managed policy, the latter should reflect a clear demarcation of space that
coincides with agricultural patterns, aquifer characteristics, and agents’ behavior.
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CHAPTER 3. IMPACTS OF ALTERNATE GROUNDWATER POLICY
INSTRUMENTS ON JOINT QUALITY-QUANTITY
MANAGEMENT
3.1. Introduction
Common property resources are harvested indiscriminately. Resources deplete and to
some extent may even become extinct because there is a lack of the incentives
required to restrain the users’ behavior (Hardin, 1968; McCay and Acheson, 1987).
Users get the short-term or immediate benefits by extracting common resources;
however, there is a societal cost that is not accounted for in the process (McCay and
Acheson, 1987). In the case of the groundwater resource, in the absence of regulations,
there is a lack of motivation or incentives for groundwater users to reduce their pumping
to a predetermined or consensus level due to the tragedy of commons reasoning. If any
users voluntarily pump less than their required demand, neighboring users have no
incentive to do the same. Thus, such race to the bottom behavior results in overextraction without considering the spatio-temporal effects on neighbors. This can be
avoided by implementing management policies (Roberts, 1992; Guilfoos et al., 2016;
Rad et al., 2020). The objective of this essay is to assess the impact of groundwater
management policy instruments on the optimal management of the Mississippi River
Alluvial Aquifer (MRAA) when both water quality and water quantity are under
consideration. I proposed three policy instruments, viz., quota, well depth limits, and
combined quota and well depth limit, and examine their effects on water quality and
water quantity in the aquifer.
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In arid and semi-arid regions across the globe, groundwater is the major source
of irrigation that mitigates risks associated with irregular and fluctuating precipitation
patterns. The buffer value of groundwater in those regions is high; however, many
aquifers are depleting because of the competition among many different users to extract
groundwater (Rodell et al., 2009a; Famiglietti et al., 2011; Wada et al., 2012; Richey et
al., 2015). Moreover, greater access to aquifer has altered the cropping pattern from
less water-intensive crops to more water-intensive crops and expanded the irrigated
land (Pfeiffer and Lin, 2014a). Higher groundwater demand has created stress on the
aquifer that may result in land subsidence, higher pumping cost, lower well capacity,
and saltwater intrusion (Provencher and Burt, 1993; Roseta-Palma, 2002; 2003;
Konikow and Kendy, 2005; Erdlenbruch et al., 2014; Hrozencik et al., 2017).
Since 2004, corn and soybean acreages overlying the confined MRAA have
expanded by 100% and 300%, respectively (USDA-NASS, 2019). The adoption of
irrigation technologies such as the submersible pump and poly pipe allowed greater
access and sufficient supply of groundwater to the agricultural fields. The higher rate of
extraction contributes to the formation of cones of depression. Over-extraction incurs
pumping externality and environmental externality in the case of an inland aquifer like
the MRAA, where the saltwater aquifer lies beneath the freshwater aquifer. The
pumping cost in year 𝑡 + 1 is higher than that of year 𝑡. Similarly, saltwater moves
upwards to the freshwater (towards the pumping height in the groundwater) due to overextraction. Saline water will eventually reduce crop yield and the profitability of farmers
(Dhakal, 2018). ;
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Saltwater intrusion in an aquifer could be endogenous or exogenous or both
(Tsur and Zemel, 2004; 2014; Poudel and Paudel, 2018). Exogenous uncertainty solely
depends upon nature, and thus decision-makers have no control over it. Stochastic
environmental factors, as an exogenous factor, trigger the abrupt regime shift10 that
could have either the stock effect11 or the system dynamic effect12 (Poudel and Paudel,
2018). For example, saltwater intrusion may occur abruptly in the freshwater aquifer and
shift the regime (system dynamic effect) despite recharge or effective management. In
another case, endogenous uncertainty (commonly known as risk) occurs due to the
limited knowledge of the resource manager regarding the parameters impacting the
system (Tsur and Zemel, 2014). It is also known as ignorance uncertainty. For example,
a higher rate of groundwater depletion reduces the stock level. Further extraction may
significantly bring down the groundwater level, below the threshold level resulting in
saltwater intrusion.
I consider saltwater intrusion as an endogenous risk in an inland aquifer, where
the event occurs because of higher groundwater extraction at the given well depth. My
focus is in the study area where saltwater underlies freshwater. A transition zone
separates the overlying freshwater and underlying saltwater. A higher pumping rate
upcones the transition zone towards the well screen (Reilly and Goodman, 1987; Zhou
et al., 2005; Jakovovic et al., 2016). A deeper well closer to the transition zone is more
likely to pump saltwater (Reilly and Goodman, 1985; Reilly and Goodman, 1987;

10

The conversion of the structure and function of one dynamic system to another system is called a
regime shift.
11

The stock effect is the reduction of the stock to zero.

12

The dynamic effect is the transformation of the system into a less desirable system.
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Essink, 2001). Wirojanagud and Charbeneau (1985) find that the reduction in well
depth, as well as groundwater extraction, can avoid the event of saltwater intrusion.
Asghar et al. (2002) show that the upconing can be avoided with critical discharge
(pumping limit) and maintaining the appropriate depth of the skimming wells in the
swallow inland aquifer. Katic and Grafton (2011) show that the joint decision to reduce
the pumping and well depth develops more resilience to saltwater intrusion.
Groundwater management policy instruments such as clearly defined property
rights, water pricing, taxes, and quota are useful for managing groundwater extraction
(Mulligan et al., 2014; Okun, 2015; Rad et al., 2020). Moreover, some groundwater
management strategies, including mandatory well space and restrictions on the drilling
of any further wells, are also effective in overcoming the common-pool externalities
(Drysdale and Hendricks, 2018). Petheram et al. (2008), Tsai (2010), and Katic and
Grafton (2011) show the relationship between groundwater extraction and saltwater
intrusion. Quota manages the groundwater supply rather than demand. It sets an
extraction limit and reduces the misallocation and over-extraction of groundwater
(Koundouri, 2004). As compared to the water pricing instrument, it is more equitable,
transparent, and efficient (Dinar and Tsur, 1999). Rad et al. (2020) find that both quota
and water pricing have the same cost-effectiveness on reducing groundwater extraction.
The outcome from quota and water pricing in water conservation is almost the same,
but water pricing reduces farm income (Latinopoulos, 2005). Quota could be less
efficient because of the associated regulation and monitoring cost (Blanco-Gutiérrez et
al., 2011). However, recent developments in technology make it more efficient such as
an internet-accessible smart water meters (Zekri, 2009; Zekri et al., 2017).
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If the reduction of groundwater extraction is necessary, quota can be allocated
according to the crop choice, farm acreage, and location (Molle et al., 2008; Molle,
2009; Saak and Peterson, 2012). Quota allocation proportional to the farm area causes
uneven distribution of welfare (Blanco-Gutiérrez et al., 2011). The bigger farm gets
more benefits compared to the smaller or medium farm (Molle, 2009; Blanco-Gutiérrez
et al., 2011). Moreover, the proportionality of irrigated land converted to rainfed farming
is higher for large farms due to quota (Blanco-Gutiérrez et al., 2011). Literature
assessing the impact of quota on groundwater management, including the most recent
study of Guilfoos et al. (2016), Hrozencik et al. (2017), and Rad et al. (2020),
considered quota based on the physical attributes or the sensitivity of the farm location.
However, I define quota based on the aquifer’s characteristics. I develop pumping limits
heterogeneously depending on the distance between the end of the well and the initial
saltwater-freshwater interface.
Katic and Grafton (2011) also use depth restriction and quantity limit, but my
study is distinct in three different ways. First, I limit the quantity on the basis of the
aquifer characteristic and farmers' behavior. Second, I do not consider the uniform
depth of the well across the study region. The well depth used in this study is the actual
depth obtained from the groundwater model, calibrated with the USGS, that varies
spatially. Third, I consider different water demand functions for different crops. The
optimum pumping path would be affected by the water demand function. Considering a
single water demand function representing all major crops could result in different
extraction paths compared to a scenario where demand functions are different for
individual crops. For example, the water demand for rice is drastically different from the
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demand for cotton. Profits are overestimated if the groundwater quality (salinity) is
discarded from the hydro-economic model designed for the aquifer where saltwater
intrusion is a rising concern. Novel to this study is the evaluation of different
groundwater policy instruments at a spatially heterogeneous level, considering the
tradeoff between the quantity and quality in the profit maximization framework.
Results suggested that the quantity limit (quota) has two profits. It prevents wells
from drying out and reduces the impact of salinity in the crop yield. Depth restriction
results in higher profits compared to other instruments, but the number of dry wells is
significantly higher when using depth limit as a policy instrument. A salinity
concentration below the initial equilibrium freshwater-saltwater interface also affects the
welfare estimates and optimal extraction path. I find that a joint depth restriction and
quota instrument results in a more resilient system and provides a higher amount of
profit compared to other policy instruments.
In Louisiana, there is no policy regarding groundwater extraction. Previous
authors have indicated that some kind of policy intervention should be implemented for
sustainable groundwater extraction (Louisiana Ground Water Resources Commission,
2012). However, it is not clear what policy instruments could work to achieve an
economically and environmentally sustainable outcome (Megdal et al., 2015). To
balance the economic-hydrological system and gain sustainable profit from the aquifer,
alternative groundwater management instruments are necessary.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I provide the
conceptual framework of my hydro-economic model. Section 3.3 shows how I develop
the hydro-economic model for the MRAA region that incorporates both the quality and
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quantity aspects of groundwater management. Section 3.4 describes alternative
groundwater management policies. Section 3.5 and 3.6 define the parameterization and
numerical optimization set up for the model. In section 3.7, I present the results and
discuss the implication of the results in policy formulation. I conclude with the broader
applicability of the findings and future research directions in section 3.8.
3.2. Conceptual Model
There are many studies assessing the management of saltwater intrusion in the coastal
aquifer (Giambastiani et al., 2007; Abd-Elhamid and Javadi, 2011; Karatzas and Dokou,
2015); however, there exists a limited number of studies related to inland saltwater
intrusion management (Reilly and Goodman, 1987; Asghar et al., 2002; Katic and
Grafton, 2011). Saltwater intrusion could happen at an individual well level or on a
regional scale. An individual well can pump saltwater even if the freshwater-saltwater
head equilibrium is maintained on the regional scale (Katic and Grafton, 2011). To
supply freshwater to an individual well, the regional scale must have a required quantity
of water. However, the equilibrium state at the regional level does not assure that there
will not be saltwater intrusion beneath the specific, vulnerable individual pumping well.
The higher extraction of the above lying freshwater aquifer causes upconing and
saltwater is transported to the well (Reilly and Goodman, 1985; Reilly and Goodman,
1987; Jakovovic et al., 2016).
Freshwater and saltwater are separated by a transition zone, the freshwatersaltwater interface (FW-SW interface), represented as the initial interface in Figure 3.1.
At an initial equilibrium, 𝛼𝑖 is the depth of the freshwater aquifer at a location 𝑖; 𝑎𝑖 is the
distance from the ground surface to the FW-SW interface; 𝑑𝑖 is the depth of the well;
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(a)

(b)
Figure 3.1. (a) The groundwater system. Source: (Reilly and Goodman, 1987). (b)
Irrigation well13
13

Source: https://earlsandersinc.com/water-well-drilling/welldiagram/
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and 𝑠𝑖 is the depth from the end of the well to the FW-SW interface, where 0 ≤ 𝑠𝑖 ≤
(𝑎𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖 ). Irrigation wells are heterogeneously distributed and located at known places. I
assume that each well at location 𝑖 belongs to a farmer, which means 𝑖 represents both
farmer and location. At year t for crop 𝑗, an individual farmer extracts the groundwater
amount 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡 . Irrigated land has higher productivity than non-irrigated land. However, with
the higher amount of groundwater extraction, the upconing happens and the initial FWSW equilibrium shifts towards the well screen. The deeper well closer to the equilibrium
is more likely to pump saltwater.
3.3. Hydro-economic Model
The impacts of groundwater management policy instruments on profits and water
allocation should be analyzed by combining the economic and hydrological tools.
Hydro-economic models connect the physical attributes of groundwater to the economic
theory of demand and supply for groundwater. LSU agricultural economists and
hydrologic engineers have collaborated to develop a groundwater model for the MRAA
(Bhatta et al., 2018; Karakullukcu, 2018). Karakullukcu (2018) constructs a
hydrostratigraphic architecture of the MRAA in MODFLOW 2005 with 7,259 well logs.
He employs the natural neighbor interpolation method to develop a three-dimensional
groundwater model and calibrates the model with the groundwater level data from the
USGS to estimate the parameters. I develop the MRAA groundwater hydro-economic
model and use the output of the MRAA groundwater model in the hydro-economic
model. The MRAA model includes all ten northeast Louisiana parishes, whereas I focus
only on 1469 wells located in Concordia, Catahoula, Franklin, and Tensas parishes,
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where groundwater salinity is a growing concern (Figure 3.2). To estimate the income
above variable cost14 (I will refer to the income above variable cost as profit15) from the
irrigated land, the functional form is given as
𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑝𝑗 ×. 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖𝑡

(3 − 1)

Figure 3.2. Groundwater head from the mean sea level in the MRAA groundwater
model. The red area in the MRAA region shows the cone of depression which is more
prone to saltwater intrusion. Here, for example, 4.0 indicates the groundwater head is 4
meters above the sea level.

14

The income over the variable cost as defined in Paudel et al. (1998).

15

Merrill and Guilfoos (2017) also refer to the returns from irrigated land as profit.
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where 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the profit from crop land at location 𝑖 = 1,2, … . , 𝑁 at time 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 for
the agricultural commodity 𝑗 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛, 𝑐𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑛, 𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒, 𝑠𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛, 𝑜𝑟 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡; 𝑝𝑗 is the price of the
commodity 𝑗; 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the yield of the commodity, 𝑗, per square meter; 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 is the total
cultivated area at location 𝑖; and 𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the total cost of energy to extract groundwater.
Crop yield, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 , is a function of the total ground application in a cropping season. I
modify Jensen (1968); Nairizi and Rydzewski (1977), and Rao et al. (1988)’s water and
crop yield relation as
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑦𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∗ 𝑓 (

𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 )
𝑞𝑖𝑗

(3 − 2)

where, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the actual yield, 𝑦𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the potential (maximum) yield that is not limited by
𝑚𝑎𝑥
irrigation or soil moisture; 𝑞𝑖𝑡 is the actual water applied, and 𝑞𝑖𝑗
is the water needed
𝑚𝑎𝑥
for maximum yield. The value of 𝑞𝑖𝑗
is different for different crops (Tacker and Vories,

2000; Tacker et al., 2008; Vories and Barnes, 2012; Ort and Long, 2014). The demand
𝑞

𝑖𝑡
𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
for water is given by the crop water production function, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
= 𝑓 (𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥
), which is also
𝑖𝑗

𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
different for different crops. For corn, cotton, soybean, and wheat: 0 < 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤ 1,
𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
whereas for rice: 0 ≤ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤ 1. Crop yield production functions with respect to water

for corn (University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2013; Trout and DeJonge, 2017), cotton
(Lindsay, 2010; USDA-Agricultural Research Service, 2019), rice (Bastiaanssen and
Steduto, 2017), soybean (P. Tracker and Vories, 2000; Payero et al., 2005; Sharda et
al., 2019), and wheat (Al-Kaisi et al., 1997) are given as
2

𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛:

𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡

𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
= 0.3938 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) + 0.0202 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) + 0.64
𝑞𝑗
𝑞𝑗
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(3 − 3)

2

𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑛:

𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡

𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
= 0.2519 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) − 1901 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) + 0.88
𝑞𝑗
𝑞𝑗

(3 − 4)

2

𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑒:

𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡

𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
= 0.2054 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) + 0.8121 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 )
𝑞𝑗
𝑞𝑗

(3 − 5)

2

𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠:

𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡

𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
= 0.6272 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) − 0.3079 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) + 0.66
𝑞𝑗
𝑞𝑗

(3 − 6)

2

𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡:

𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡

𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
= 0.406 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) − 0.1637 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) + 0.78
𝑞𝑗
𝑞𝑗

(3 − 7)

The constant terms in the above equations show the yield in dry land farming when 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
equals zero. I assume that the farmers are rational and they limit their extraction as
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑗
. The application of water more than the required amount may reduce the

crop yield because of waterlogging conditions. Farmers experience the diminishing
𝑚𝑎𝑥
marginal rate of productivity if they irrigate with an amount greater than 𝑞𝑖𝑗
.

In addition to the irrigated volume of water, groundwater quality also affects crop
yield. Since our study region has a groundwater salinity issue, application of potential
𝑚𝑎𝑥
water needed (𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗
) may not always yield maximum profit. The saltwater

concentration in groundwater is a function of the total amount of groundwater extracted
(Reilly and Goodman, 1987; Asghar et al., 2002). The presence of saltwater at the well
screen level affects crop yield depending on the salinity concentration. As given by
Houk et al. (2006), the combined effect of the total volume of extracted groundwater and
groundwater salinity on the actual yield is the modification of equation (3-2), such as
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦

𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑦𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
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(3 − 8)

The salinity concentration at the upconing or the FW-SW interface is lower than the
salinity concentration at the deeper region of the saltwater aquifer in the MRAA
(Whitfield, 1975; Welch and Hanor, 2011). Unless saltwater encroachment reaches an
extremely high saltwater concentration, I assume that there would not be a 100% yield
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦

loss due to groundwater salinity (Maas and Hoffman, 1977). Thus, the value of 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦

would be 0 ≤ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡

≤ 1.

The saltwater is a function of the critical rise of the FW-SW interface, 𝑍, and the
distance between the bottom of the well and the FW-SW interface, s. At location 𝑖, the
relative yield from salinity is given as
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦

𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡

= 𝑔𝑗 (

𝑍𝑖𝑡
)
𝑠𝑖

(3 − 9)

Schmork and Mercado (1969) and Essink (2001) define the critical rise of the FW-SW
interface as:

𝑍(𝑟, 𝑡) =

𝑞
[
2𝜋𝛼𝑘𝑥 𝑠

1
(1 +

1
2
𝑅 ′ )2

1

−
[(1 +

𝛾 ′ )2

+

1]
2 2
′
𝑅 ]

(3 − 10)

1

𝑟 𝑘2
𝑅′ = 𝑧
𝑠 𝑘𝑥
𝛼𝑘𝑧
𝑡
2𝜂𝑒 𝑠

(3 − 12)

𝜌𝑠𝑤 − 𝜌𝑓𝑤
𝜌𝑓𝑤

(3 − 13)

𝛾′ =
𝛼=

(3 − 11)
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where, 𝑟 is the affected radial distance16; 𝑘𝑧 and 𝑘𝑥 are vertical and horizontal hydraulic
conductivities, respectively; s is the distance between the bottom of the well and the
initial FW-SW interface; 𝜌𝑠𝑤 and 𝜌𝑓𝑤 are the specific weights of saltwater and
freshwater, respectively; 𝜂𝑒 is the porosity of the aquifer; and t is the time elapsed since
the start of pumping. I assume the upconing of the interface happens directly beneath
the well. Therefore, 𝑟 = 0.
𝑍(0, 𝑡) =

𝑍𝑖𝑡 =

𝑞
1
[1 −
]
(1 + 𝛾 ′ )
2𝜋𝛼𝑘𝑥 𝑠

𝑞𝑖𝑡
1
[1 −
]
(1 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡′ )
2𝜋𝛼𝑘𝑥𝑖 𝑠𝑖

(3 − 14)

(3 − 15)

Implying from equation (3-12), the critical rise in year 𝑡 + 1 is greater than the rise in
year 𝑡 with the same amount of extraction. The ratio of the critical rise and the distance
between the end of the well and the FW-SW interface gives the saltwater percentage
above the interface (Schmork and Mercado, 1969). The saltwater percentage, 𝜙𝑖𝑡 , is
given as
𝑍𝑖𝑡 3
𝑍𝑖𝑡 2
𝑍𝑖𝑡
𝜙𝑖𝑡 = 15.956 ( ) − 15.108 ( ) + 5.6783 ( )
𝑠𝑖
𝑠𝑖
𝑠𝑖

(3 − 16)

The total dissolved solid (TDS) concentration17 at the well screen after the upconing
would differ from the concentration below the initial FW-SW equilibrium (Schmork and
Mercado, 1969). Therefore, the TDS18 at the well screen is such that

16

Assuming the end of the well is above the horizontal initial saltwater-freshwater interface and the
hypothetical enlargement of the well intersects the FW-SW interface at point 𝑚, r is the distance between
𝑚 and the point at the interface where upconing starts.
17 TDS is composed of cations or anions such as 𝑁𝑎+ , 𝐶𝑎2+ , 𝐾 + , 𝑀𝑔2+ , 𝑆𝑂42− , 𝐻𝐶𝑂3− ,or 𝐶𝑙 −
18 The unit of TDS: 1 mg/L = 1 ppm (parts per million)
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𝑇𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 =

{𝜙𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑠𝑤 + (100 − 𝜙𝑖𝑡 )𝐶𝑓𝑤 }
(100 ∗ 640)

(3 − 17)19

where TDS is in 𝐸𝑐 , 𝐶𝑠𝑤 is the TDS of saltwater beneath the aquifer (35000 mg/L to
45000mg/L) and 𝐶𝑓𝑤 is the TDS of the overlying freshwater aquifer (2000 mg/L)
(Walton, 1989; Welch, 2009; Gillip, 2014; Louisiana Department of Environmental
Quality, 2014; USGS, 2017). The extended form of 𝑇𝐷𝑆 at location 𝑖 and year 𝑡 is
𝑍 3
𝑍 2
𝑍
(15.956 ( 𝑠𝑖𝑡 ) − 15.108 ( 𝑠𝑖𝑡 ) + 5.6783 ( 𝑠𝑖𝑡 )) ∗ 35000 +
𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑍 3
𝑍 2
𝑍
{100 − (15.956 ( 𝑠𝑖𝑡 ) − 15.108 ( 𝑠𝑖𝑡 ) + 5.6783 ( 𝑠𝑖𝑡 ))} ∗ 2000

𝑇𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 =

[

𝑖

𝑖

100 ∗ 640

𝑖

]

(3 − 18)

Maas and Hoffman (1977) observe the impacts of salinity in crop growth rate and
plant size. They give the threshold level of salinity for different crops below which there
would be no yield reduction. They also provide the rate of yield reduction for different
crops when the salinity exceeds the threshold level. Equation (3-18) gives the TDS for
each location on the basis of the water demand at that location. Since water demand is
crop-specific, the impact of the developed salinity level at the well screen on the crop, 𝑗,
is such that
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦

𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡

=1−

𝐵𝑗 (𝑇𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑗𝑡 )
100

(3 − 19)

where the slope, 𝐵𝑗 , represents the crop yield loss per unit of salinity level rise; 𝐸𝑗𝑡 is the

19

I divide the equation (3-17) by 100 to convert the percentage to proportion and by 640 to convert the
mg/L to 𝐸𝑐 .
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threshold salinity level that a crop can tolerate. If 𝑇𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 < 𝐸𝑗𝑡 , then 𝐵𝑗 (𝑇𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑗𝑡 ) = 0,
which means the salinity level below the threshold level has no impact on crop yield.
Mass and Hoffman determine the values of 𝐵 and 𝐸 𝑡 for 𝑗 = corn, rice, soybean, and
wheat shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Salinity threshold and slope by Maas and Hoffman (1977).
Crop
Salinity threshold 𝐸𝑐 (𝐸 𝑡 ) % yield reduction per unit increase in 𝐸𝑐 (𝐵)
Corn
3.7
12
Cotton
7.7
5.2
Rice
3
12
Soybean
5
20
Wheat
6
7.1
Note: There is no yield reduction due to salinity if salinity concentration in the groundwater is below
threshold (𝐸 𝑡 ). If the groundwater salinity is greater than the threshold, per unit increase in salinity
reduces the crop yield given by (𝑏). Salinity concentration is measured in 𝐸𝑐 . Based on the values given
in this table, for example, the salinity level below 3.7 does not affect corn yield.

The total pumping cost (𝐶𝑖𝑡 ), given in equation (3-1), is the function of both the state
variable (groundwater head) and the control variable (amount of groundwater
extracted).
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑤. 𝑞𝑖𝑡 (ℎ̅𝑖𝑒 − ℎ𝑖𝑡 )

(3 − 20)

w is the energy cost20 to extract 1m3 groundwater from one-meter depth; ℎ̅𝑖𝑒 is the
ground surface elevation; and ℎ𝑖𝑡 is the groundwater height elevation (groundwater
head).
The groundwater head for year 𝑡 + 1 is the function of the head at year 𝑡, volume
of water extracted, and the hydrological parameters. For a confined aquifer, following
Merrill and Guilfoos (2017) and Koundouri et al. (2017), the equation of motion is
defined as:

20

The cost is estimated on the assumption that farmers use diesel pumps.
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ℎ𝑖𝑡+1 = ℎ𝑖𝑡 −

𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒
𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑐𝑖

𝑆𝑐𝑖 = 𝑆𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝑏𝑖

(3 − 21)
(3 − 22)

𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒
𝑞𝑖𝑡
is the optimum quantity of water extracted in each case (cases are defined in the

next section) at the individual well, 𝑖, at the time; 𝑡, 𝐴 is the area of the aquifer; 𝑆𝑐𝑖 is the
storativity coefficient; 𝑆𝑠𝑖 is the specific storage; and 𝑏𝑖 is the aquifer thickness. I obtain
the hydrological parameters including the initial head of the MRAA from the model
developed by Karakullukcu (2018).
When the saturated thickness of the aquifer drops to zero, groundwater wells
pump sand and clay. Thus, pumping is not feasible with the reduced saturated
thickness. Similar to Guilfoos et al. (2016) and Katic and Grafton (2011), I assume that
farmers can pump water until the distance from the end of the well to the initial
groundwater head reduces by 70%. Since MRAA is a confined aquifer, the depleted
amount of water cannot be refilled with the boundary recharge. Guilfoos et al. (2016)
assume that once the well dries out, it exits the market forever. I also assume that when
a well dries out, farmers switch to dryland farming.
3.4. Policy Scenarios
To evaluate the impacts of the groundwater management policy instruments in private
returns at the regional level, I develop five different scenarios including three policy
instruments: open access (baseline scenario), quantity limit, well depth limit, combined
quantity and well depth limit, and open access without salinity. Equation (3-1) can be
written as
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𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑍
𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 , 𝑞𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝑝𝑗 . 𝑦𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 . 𝑓 (𝑞max
) . 𝑔 ( 𝑠𝑖𝑡) − 𝑤. 𝑞𝑖𝑡 (ℎ̅𝑖𝑒 − ℎ𝑖𝑡 )
𝑖

𝑖𝑗

(3 − 23)

I assume that the returns increase with higher groundwater extraction and groundwater
height :

𝜕(𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 ,𝑞𝑖𝑡 ))
𝜕(𝑞𝑖𝑡 )

> 0;

𝜕(𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 ,𝑞𝑖𝑡 ))
𝜕(ℎ𝑖𝑡 )

> 0. With the extraction and head reduction, the

pumping cost also increases which is defined as:

𝜕2 (𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 ,𝑞𝑖𝑡 ))
𝜕(𝑞𝑖𝑡 )2

< 0; and

𝜕2 (𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 ,𝑞𝑖𝑡 ))
𝜕(ℎ𝑖𝑡 )2

≤

0. Farmers would exploit groundwater resources either until the marginal profit of
pumping equals the marginal cost or until the well dries. I assume that farmers are
myopic and they maximize their profits in each period. The present value of the future
profit is discounted with different discount rates, 𝑟: 1%, 4%, 10%, and gamma discount.
Following Weitzman (2001), the gamma discount rate 𝑟 at time 𝑡 is:
𝑟(𝑡) =

𝜇
𝑡𝜎 2
1+ 𝜇

(3 − 24)

where 𝜇 = 4% is the mean discount rate from the survey and 𝜎 = 3% is the standard
deviation. The discount factor, 𝛽, is defined as
1

𝛽 = (1+𝑟)

(3 − 25)

3.4.1. Case I: open access
There is no policy intervention in this case. Farmers extract water to maximize profit
[equation (3-23)] subject to the head constraint given in equation (3-21) and other
physical parameters, such that:
∞
𝑐1
)]
max
[∑ 𝛽 𝑡 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 , 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑐1
𝑞𝑖𝑡

𝑡=0

Subject to:
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(3 − 26)

ℎ𝑖𝑡+1

𝑐1
𝑞𝑖𝑡
= ℎ𝑖𝑡 −
𝐴𝑆𝑐𝑖

ℎ𝑖0 = 𝑪 (𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛)
𝑐1
max1
0 ≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑡
≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑗
1
1
𝑍𝑖𝑡
𝑍𝑖𝑡
= 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ( , 1)
𝑠𝑖
𝑠𝑖

𝑑𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0.3 ∗ 𝑑𝑖0
𝑑𝑖0 = ℎ𝑖0 − 𝑘𝑖
𝑑𝑖𝑡 = ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖
where 𝑑𝑖𝑡 defines a portion of the groundwater height above the well bottom at period 𝑡,
𝑑𝑖0 is a portion of the groundwater height above the well bottom at the initial period, ℎ𝑖0
is the initial groundwater head, and 𝑘𝑖 is the elevation at well bottom.
3.4.2. Case II: quota
Saltwater upconing is a function of the ratio of critical rise and the distance between the
𝑍

FW-SW interface and the bottom of the well ( 𝑠 𝑖 ) [i.e., equation (3-17)]. Moreover, the
𝑖

critical rise, 𝑍𝑖 , depends on the quantity extracted 𝑞𝑖 [i.e.,equation (3-15)]. Reducing the
quantity of extraction reduces the critical rise and ultimately reduces the impact of
salinity. Reilly and Goodman (1987) and Essink (2001) define an equation for the critical
discharge rate. The critical discharge rate is the threshold extraction volume below
which well screen does not pump saltwater. It depends on the hydrological parameters,
such as the horizontal hydraulic conductivity and the distance between the well screen
and the FW-SW interface. Those parameters vary spatially. Brozović et al. (2010) show
the uneven distributional impact on welfare and extraction path if spatially
heterogeneous aquifer characteristics are not considered for quota allocation. The
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quota is generally designed by limiting the maximum allowable extraction by a certain
percentage (Guilfoos et al., 2016; Rad et al., 2020). I develop a scenario where farmers
are allowed to pump based on the hydrological characteristics of the aquifer. Following
Reilly and Goodman (1987) and Essink (2001), the maximum allowable extraction
quantity is given by
𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙2 = 𝑍𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 2𝜋𝛼𝑘𝑥𝑖 𝑠𝑖

(3 − 27)

𝑍

( 𝑠 𝑖 ) ≤ 0.5 is considered as the threshold level ratio. Therefore, I choose 𝑍𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 = 𝑍𝑖 =
𝑖

0.5 ∗ 𝑠. In some cases, the quota, 𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙2 , is greater than the maximum amount of
water required for maximum yield, 𝑞𝑖𝑀𝑎𝑥1 . I limit the quota, 𝑞𝑖𝑀𝑎𝑥2 , as
𝑞𝑖𝑀𝑎𝑥2 = min(𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙2 , 𝑞𝑖𝑀𝑎𝑥1 )

(3 − 28)

A profit-maximizing farm manages the extensive and intensive margin of irrigated
water use based on water availability (Suter et al., 2019). A limited amount of water
results either in altering cropping patterns from more water-intensive crops to less
water-intensive crops or reducing the irrigated area. I assume that farmers do not
change their cropping patterns. However, they reduce the irrigated area with the given
quota. In quota, farmers may have irrigated and dry land parcels.
The profit function in quota is given as
𝑐2
) = {𝑝𝑗 . 𝑦𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑐21 . 𝑓 (
𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 , 𝑞𝑖𝑡

𝑐2
𝑞𝑖𝑡

𝑍𝑖𝑡2
𝑐2 ̅
)
.
𝑔
(
) − 𝑤. 𝑞𝑖𝑡
(ℎ𝑖𝑒 − ℎ𝑖𝑡 )} +
𝑀𝑎𝑥2
𝑠
𝑞𝑖
𝑖
𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐶2

{𝑝𝑗 . 𝑦𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑐22 . 𝑦𝑖𝑡

}

(3 − 29)

𝑐2
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝐶2 is the relative yield in dryland farming when 𝑞𝑖𝑡
= 0 in equations (3-3), (3-

4), (3-5), (3-6), and (3-7). Moreover, following the study of Saak and Peterson
(2012), I assume that farmers neither temporally use nor spatially trade their quota.
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The optimization problem, in this case, can be set up as:
∞
𝑐2
)]
max
[∑ 𝛽 𝑡 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 , 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑐2
𝑞𝑖𝑡

(3 − 30)

𝑡=0

Subject to:
ℎ𝑖𝑡+1

𝑐2
𝑞𝑖𝑡
= ℎ𝑖𝑡 −
𝐴𝑆𝑐𝑖

ℎ𝑖0 = 𝑪 (𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛)
𝑐2
max2
0 ≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑡
≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑗

𝑍𝑖𝑡2
𝑍𝑖𝑡2
= 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ( , 1)
𝑠𝑖
𝑠𝑖
𝑑𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0.3 ∗ 𝑑𝑖0
𝑑𝑖0 = ℎ𝑖0 − 𝑘𝑖
𝑑𝑖𝑡 = ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖
3.4.3. Case III: depth limit
Reducing the depth of the well increases the distance between the initial FW-SW
interface and the bottom of the well. Thus, the probability of saltwater intrusion is
comparatively lower when the well depth is reduced (Asghar et al., 2002). As the MRAA
is a shallow aquifer, I limit the depth of the well by 8%. Since the depth of the well
varies, the values of 𝑠 also changes to 𝑠 𝑐3 .
The profit function in depth limit is given as
𝑐3
𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑍𝑖𝑡𝑐3
𝑐3
𝑐3 ̅
) = 𝑝𝑗 . 𝑦𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 . 𝑓 ( max1
𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 , 𝑞𝑖𝑡
) . 𝑔 ( 𝑐3 ) − 𝑤. 𝑞𝑖𝑡
(ℎ𝑖𝑒 − ℎ𝑖𝑡 )
𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑠𝑖

The optimization model in this case is the same as the case I.
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(3 − 31)

∞
𝑐3
)]
max
[∑ 𝛽 𝑡 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 , 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑐3
𝑞𝑖𝑡

𝑡=0

Subject to:
ℎ𝑖𝑡+1

𝑐3
𝑞𝑖𝑡
= ℎ𝑖𝑡 −
𝐴𝑆𝑐𝑖

ℎ𝑖0 = 𝑪 (𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛)
𝑐3
max1
0 ≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑡
≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑗

𝑍𝑖𝑡𝑐3
𝑍𝑖𝑡𝑐3
=
𝑚𝑖𝑛
(
, 1)
𝑠𝑖𝑐3
𝑠𝑖𝑐3
𝑘𝑖3 = 𝑘𝑖 + 0.08(ℎ̅𝑖𝑒 − 𝑘𝑖 )
𝑑𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0.3 ∗ 𝑑𝑖0
𝑑𝑖0 = ℎ𝑖0 − 𝑘𝑖3
𝑑𝑖𝑡 = ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖3
where 𝑘𝑖3 is the new elevation of the bottom of the well after reducing the depth.
3.4.4. Case IV: combined quantity and depth limit
This case is a combination of case II and case III. After reducing the depth of the well by
8%, I limit the quantity of pump as described in case II. With the reduced well depth, 𝑠
becomes 𝑠 𝑐4 and the quota becomes 𝑞𝑖𝑀𝑎𝑥4 .
𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙4 = 𝑍𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 2𝜋𝛼𝑘𝑥𝑖 𝑠𝑖𝑐4
As described in case II, 𝑍𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 = 𝑍𝑖 = 0.5 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑐4 and 𝑞𝑖𝑀𝑎𝑥4 = min(𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙4 , 𝑞𝑖𝑀𝑎𝑥1 ).
The profit function is
𝑐4
) = 𝑝𝑗 . 𝑦𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑐41 . 𝑓 (
𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 , 𝑞𝑖𝑡

𝑐4
𝑞𝑖𝑡

𝑍𝑖𝑡𝑐4
𝑐4 ̅
)
.
𝑔
(
) − 𝑤. 𝑞𝑖𝑡
(ℎ𝑖𝑒 − ℎ𝑖𝑡 ) +
𝑠𝑖𝑐4
𝑞𝑖𝑀𝑎𝑥4
𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐶4

{𝑝𝑗 . 𝑦𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑐42 . 𝑦𝑖𝑡
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}

(3 − 32)

𝑐4
𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝐶4 is the relative yield in dryland farming when 𝑞𝑖𝑡
= 0 in 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡

The objective of this case is
∞
𝑐4
)]
max
[∑ 𝛽 𝑡 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 , 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑐4
𝑞𝑖𝑡

𝑡=0

Subject to:
ℎ𝑖𝑡+1

𝑐4
𝑞𝑖𝑡
= ℎ𝑖𝑡 −
𝐴𝑆𝑐𝑖

ℎ𝑖0 = 𝑪 (𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛)
𝑐4
max4
0 ≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑡
≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑗

𝑍𝑖𝑡𝑐4
𝑍𝑖𝑡𝑐4
= 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ( 𝑐4 , 1)
𝑠𝑖𝑐4
𝑠𝑖
𝑘𝑖4 = 𝑘𝑖 + 0.08(ℎ̅𝑖𝑒 − 𝑘𝑖 )
𝑑𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0.3 ∗ 𝑑𝑖0
𝑑𝑖0 = ℎ𝑖0 − 𝑘𝑖4
𝑑𝑖𝑡 = ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖4
3.4.5. Case V: no salinity open-access
I also evaluate the extraction patterns of myopic farmers for maximizing profits without
considering the salinity issue in the study region. The difference between the two openaccess cases (Case I and Case V) provides the loss in profit due to salinity. Equation
(3-23) is modified as
𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑐1 ̅
𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 , 𝑞𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝑝𝑗 . 𝑦𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖 . 𝑓 ( max ) − 𝑤. 𝑞𝑖𝑡
(ℎ𝑖𝑒 − ℎ𝑖𝑡 )
𝑞𝑖𝑗
The profit is maximized by every individual farmer. The optimization model is set up as:
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∞
𝑐5
max
[∑ 𝛽 𝑡 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡 (ℎ𝑖𝑡 , 𝑞𝑖𝑡
)]
𝑐5
𝑞𝑖𝑡

𝑡=0

Subject to:
ℎ𝑖𝑡+1

𝑐5
𝑞𝑖𝑡
= ℎ𝑖𝑡 −
𝐴𝑆𝑐𝑖

ℎ𝑖0 = 𝑪 (𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛)
𝑐5
max1
0 ≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑡
≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑗

𝑑𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0.3 ∗ 𝑑𝑖0
𝑑𝑖0 = ℎ𝑖0 − 𝑘𝑖
𝑑𝑖𝑡 = ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖
3.5. Model Parameters
I quantify the total profits of the groundwater irrigated land for four northeast Louisiana
parishes: Catahoula, Concordia, Franklin, and Tensas, lying above the MRAA. Corn
and soybean are the two major crops grown in this region (USDA-National Agricultural
Statistics Service, 2018; 2020). Due to the over-extraction for irrigation in June, July,
and August, the cone of depression forms repeatedly every year during the month of
July to September after 2008 (Figure 3.2). This region also has a groundwater salinity
issue. I visited the agricultural land and collected groundwater samples from the
irrigated wells. I found that the region has a critical level of saltwater concentration.
I obtain the hydrological parameters, including porosity, hydraulic conductivity,
specific storage, storativity, aquifer thickness, aquifer area, hydraulic head, and
elevation of the FW-SW interface, from the researchers of the Department of Civil and
Environmental Engineering at LSU and Karakullukcu (2018). The model has 1 km by 1
km grids. The physical parameters within a grid are similar but they may differ across
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the grid. A well located in one grid may have a salinity issue but another well located
adjacent to the grid may not have any issue. The MRAA model has 12 different layers of
clay and sand. The base of the 12th layer is considered the freshwater-saltwater
interface. Agricultural well depths are limited to between the 6th and 8th layers. The
detail of the groundwater model is found in Karakullukcu (2018).
I obtain the Louisiana crop commodity price and maximum crop yield under
irrigation from the NASS-USDA. The irrigated land parcel area is obtained from the
USDA-CropScape (USDA-NASS, 2019). I assume that farmers would not alter irrigation
patterns under the normal scenario. Table 3.2 shows the physical parameters of the
aquifer.
3.6. Numerical Solution
The optimal decision variable, 𝑞, is found numerically by the Sequential Linear
Programming with Trust Region Strategy using MATLAB R2019b to maximize the
profits. 𝑞 is solved at it’s different levels, ranging from 0 to 𝑞 𝑚𝑎𝑥 . The optimized value
replaces 𝑞 in the objective function and is repeated until the value converges. The value
of the groundwater head is given for the initial period. The optimum pumping volume for
the current year determines the head for the following 𝑡 year. The process continues
every year over the entire study period.
Many studies assume the steady-state level of the aquifer where the control and
state variables do not change with respect to time and the costate variable becomes
zero at the end of the study horizon. An assumption of the bottomless aquifer is
important to evaluate the optimal extraction path until the steady-state is achieved. As
described in Guilfoos et al. (2016), this chapter does not assume a time frame for the
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steady-state because I do not consider the bottomless aquifer. I also have an accurate
representation of the well depth, where wells dry out if the water level goes below a
certain level. The reason for including an uneven aquifer bottom is to evaluate the effect
of saltwater intrusion on profits. The difference between the elevation at the end of the
well and the bottom of the aquifer also determines the spatially heterogeneous
groundwater quota.
3.7. Results and Discussion
The policy instruments evaluated in this chapter are i) quota, ii) depth limit, and iii)
combined quota and depth limit. Table 3.3 shows the profits of using these policy
instruments and compares against profits obtained under open access and open access
without salinity. Consistent with the resource economic theory, I found that the present
value of future profit reduces as the discount rate increases. The lower discount rate
reduces the extraction and increases the resource stock. I did a sensitivity analysis on
the discount rate and saltwater TDS concentration to observe the behavior of the
extraction and its effects on welfare, extraction path, and well life span.
Future generations are presently represented using an appropriate discount rate.
An appropriate discount rate is very important to evaluate the activities that would have
impacts over hundreds of years. However, it is almost impossible to find a consensus
value for the discount rate because of the fundamental difference of opinions among
economists around the world (Weitzman, 2001). It is critical to choose a proper
discount rate because the unconcealed weight of uncertainty accompanies the discount
rate. Discount rate affects the optimal extraction path, profit distribution, and overall
policy evaluation. For example, my results show that the profit from open-access at a
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Table 3.2. Parameters value for the MRAA and Louisiana Agriculture.
Parameter
Description
Value
Horizontal hydraulic conductivity
𝑘𝑥
76.5-279.5 𝑚/𝑑𝑎𝑦
Vertical hydraulic conductivity
𝑘𝑧
25.5-93.2 𝑚/𝑑𝑎𝑦
Initial
hydraulic
head
from
MSL
(m)
ℎ𝑖0
-3.1 to 19.3 𝑚
Ground surface elevation from MSL
10.9 to 37.8 𝑚
ℎ̅𝑖𝑒
Elevation at the bottom of the well
𝑘𝑖
-46 to 13.7 𝑚
from MSL
Elevation at the FW-SW interface
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑒
-47.7 to -32.98 𝑚
from MSL
10.6 to 58.2 𝑚
Well depth
ℎ̅𝑖𝑒 − 𝑘𝑖
𝜌𝑠𝑤
Saltwater density at 25℃
1,025 𝑘𝑔/𝑚3
𝜌𝑓𝑤
Freshwater density at 25℃
1,000 𝑘𝑔/𝑚3
Porosity
0.3
𝜂𝑒
TDS of water brackish water
𝐶𝑠𝑤
35,000 𝑚𝑔/𝐿
TDS of freshwater
𝐶𝑓𝑤
2,000 𝑚𝑔/𝐿
Discount
rate
1%, 4%, 10% and
R
gamma discount rate
W
$0.00066306
Cost of energy to pump 1 𝑚3 volume
of water from 1 𝑚 depth
A
Aquifer area (for study region)
1,470,000,000 𝑚2
Area
Max area under irrigation [case 1 and
478,055,789.6 𝑚2
3]
Max area under irrigation [case 2]
294,246,134.5 𝑚2

Ss
B
p

𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑥

Max area under irrigation [case 4]
Specific storage
Average aquifer thickness
Corn price/kg
Cotton price/kg
Rice price/kg
Soybean price/kg
Wheat price/kg
Yield (kg/𝑚2 )21 irrigated land
Corn
Cotton
Rice
Soybean
Wheat

264,211,018.8 𝑚2
0.00009605
32.96 𝑚
$0.178
$1.63
$0.34
$0.25
$0.22
1.22
0.14
0.81
0.42
0.32

Note: All the parameters are in the SI system. Physical parameters of the aquifer are obtained from the
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at LSU and Karakullukcu (2018). Irrigated area, crop
choice, crop price is taken from USDA-NASS. The energy required to pump one 𝑚3 water from one 𝑚
depth is obtained from Dale (2016). Well depth is obtained from Strategic Online Natural Resources
Information System, the Department of Natural Resources, Louisiana.
21

Per acre yield for corn is 195 Bushel, cotton is 1270 lb., rice is 72 cwt., soybean is 62 Bushel, and
wheat is 50 Bushel.
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lower TDS ranges from $0.75 to $6.5 billion, with different discount rates over a 100year horizon. The effective discount rate declines over the time horizon because the
lower rates place the greater present value weight for the resources. However, in the
higher discount rates, resources are less important over time because of compounded
discounting (Weitzman, 2001). Therefore, I chose the gamma discounting rate given my
planning horizon is 100 years.
Comparing the two open-access cases (A and E), with salinity and without
salinity; their difference shows that salinity reduces the aggregate profit of well users by
14.8% at lower TDS concentration. The open-access profit differences increase when
the salinity problem is severe. At 45,000 ppm, the profit reduces by 32% over the 100
𝑍

years horizon. When quality is not an issue, 𝑔 ( 𝑠𝑖𝑡) [from the equation (3-23)] becomes
𝑖

𝑍

1. As the severity of salinity increases, the 𝑔 ( 𝑠𝑖𝑡 ) value moves toward 0, which is
𝑖

reflected as a huge gap in the comparison.
Any intervention on extraction quantity to maintain groundwater quality reduces
the quantity extraction and vice versa (Roseta-Palma, 2002; 2003). In the scenarios, I
have developed here, both quality quantity tradeoffs are accounted for correctly. As
farmers extract water, this impacts the salinity level as well. If the saltwater intrusion is
less likely to happen with reduced well depth, farmers will extract more water to irrigate
and thereby to obtain a higher yield. Optimal extraction due to the depth limit instrument
increases for some initial management planning years (Figures 3.3 and 3.4). Well depth
reduction also increases the number of dry wells. As the number of dry wells increases,
the cumulative optimal groundwater extraction across the aquifer also decreases.
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Table 3.3. Profit gains under different groundwater management policy instruments ($ billion).
Salt
10 years
30 years
conc. Discount
A
A
(ppm)
rate
B
C
D
E
B
C
D
E
A
35000 gamma 0.67 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.76
1.97 1.87 2.14 2.05 2.26
3.25
35000
1% 0.67 0.64 0.69 0.65 0.75
1.78 1.70 1.90 1.83 2.04
2.70
35000
4% 0.58 0.57 0.59 0.57 0.65
1.20 1.18 1.26 1.24 1.37
1.49
35000
10% 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.49
0.66 0.69 0.68 0.71 0.75
0.69
45000 gamma 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.76
1.73 1.80 1.83 1.96 2.26
2.85
45000
1% 0.60 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.75
1.57 1.64 1.65 1.77 2.04
2.37
45000
4% 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.65
1.06 1.14 1.12 1.20 1.37
1.31
45000
10% 0.39 0.44 0.41 0.45 0.49
0.59 0.67 0.61 0.69 0.75
0.62

Salt
conc. Discount
70 years
ppm
rate
A
B
C
D
E
35000 gamma 4.56 4.31 4.80 4.65 5.25
35000
1% 3.47 3.29 3.63 3.52 3.98
35000
4% 1.62 1.59 1.69 1.68 1.86
35000
10% 0.70 0.73 0.71 0.75 0.79
45000 gamma 3.98 4.12 4.17 4.47 5.25
45000
1% 3.02 3.14 3.16 3.41 3.98
45000
4% 1.42 1.53 1.49 1.61 1.86
45000
10% 0.62 0.71 0.65 0.73 0.79

A
6.50
4.35
1.69
0.70
5.65
3.78
1.49
0.62

B
6.14
4.14
1.66
0.73
5.84
3.94
1.60
0.71

100 years
C
D
6.76 6.57
4.52 4.40
1.77 1.75
0.72 0.75
5.90 6.30
3.94 4.26
1.56 1.69
0.65 0.73

50 years
B
3.09
2.57
1.46
0.72
2.96
2.47
1.41
0.70

C
3.48
2.86
1.56
0.71
3.01
2.48
1.38
0.64

D
3.37
2.77
1.54
0.74
3.23
2.67
1.48
0.73

E
3.76
3.11
1.70
0.79
3.76
3.11
1.70
0.79

E
7.47
4.98
1.94
0.79
7.47
4.98
1.94
0.79

Note: As salinity is an issue in the study region, A, B, C, and D represent the no policy (with salinity), quota, depth limit, and combined quota and
depth limit, respectively. E represents an open-access scenario without salinity and it does not include the effects of TDS concentration on profits.
For the long-term intertemporal resource allocation problem Weitzman (2001) proposes a gamma discounting framework where he categorizes
the future into the immediate future (1 to 5 years at 4% discount rate), near future (6 to 25 years at 3% discount rate), medium future (26 to 75
years at 2% discount rate), distant future (76 to 300 years at 1% discount rate), and far distant future (more than 300 years at 0% discount rate).
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Therefore, after 25 years in the depth limit scenario, the cumulative optimal quantity
extraction decreases. Over the 100-year horizon at lower and higher TDS
concentration, the depth limit instrument increases dry wells by 15% and 20%,
respectively (Figures 3.5 and 3.6).
Increasing TDS concentration at the FW-SW interface does not significantly
impact the optimal extraction path. The extraction path for quota and combined quota
and depth are below the baseline scenario. To reduce saltwater intrusion, Zekri et al.
(2017) use an electricity quota, an implicit form of water quota. They find that optimal
extraction is 20% less than open access extraction. The number of dry wells is linked
with the optimal extraction paths. The two instruments, quota and the combined quota
and depth limit, have a lower extraction rate and a lower number of dry wells. Over the
100-year horizon, dry wells in quota are 66% and 71% lower than the baseline scenario
at lower and higher TDS concentrations, respectively. Moreover, they are 52% and 61%
lower in the case of combined quota and depth limit compared to the baseline scenario
at lower and higher TDS concentration, respectively.
The farm profit is lower in quota compared to other scenarios at lower TDS
concentration (Figures 3.7). However, as the TDS concentration increases, the profit
gained from quota is higher than the base scenario (Figure 3.8). Quota may increase or
decrease farm profits (Madani and Dinar, 2012; Guilfoos et al., 2016; Rad et al., 2020),
but this depends on the restricted water amount, aquifer characteristics, and cropping
pattern.
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Figure 3.3. Cumulative optimal extraction for 35,000 ppm TDS concentration below the
FW-SW interface

Figure 3.4. Cumulative optimal extraction for 45,000 ppm TDS concentration below the
FW-SW interface
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Figure 3.5. Number of dry wells as a result of reduced groundwater head at 35,000 ppm
TDS concentration below the FW-SW interface.
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Figure 3.6. Number of dry wells as a result of reduced groundwater head at 45,000 ppm
TDS concentration below the FW-SW interface.
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The objective of the water agency is to ensure aquifer health for long-term
sustainable use. Quota lowers the groundwater depletion rate and avoids any
environmental issue that threatens aquifer quality. However, groundwater users claim to
irrigate the crop without any current production loss due to water scarcity. The
conflicting objectives between the water authority and water users could be due to a
lack of coordination or the trade-off between the economic returns and environmental
issues (Gómez‐Limón et al., 2002; Roseta-Palma, 2002; Martin and Stahn, 2013).
Quota prevents farmers from leading a race to the bottom situation where they ignore
the externalities and extract common resources indiscriminately.
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Figure 3.7. The cumulative profit with gamma discounting when the TDS concentration
below the FW-SW interface is 35,000 ppm.
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Figure 3.8. The cumulative profit with gamma discounting when the TDS concentration
below the FW-SW interface is 45,000 ppm.
Table 3.4 shows the profits gain percentage from the groundwater management
policy instruments above the base scenario. At a lower salinity impact, the profit gained
from quota is 5.56% below the open access profit over 100 years. However,
groundwater pumping affects the groundwater head. Limited pumping in quota reduces
the profit, but it also protects the wells from drying out. The depth limit creates higher
profits, but it also negatively impacts the economic life of the well.
Table 3.4. Profit gains (%) under different groundwater management policy instruments
compared to the open-access.
30 years
100 years
Discount
ppm
rate
B
C
D
B
C
D
35000 gamma
-4.88 8.60 4.20
-5.56 3.94 1.03
35000
1% -4.68 6.59 2.44
-4.73 3.97 1.06
35000
4% -1.87 4.67 3.28
-1.81 4.61 3.53
35000
10% 4.09 2.19 6.74
4.07 2.17 6.73
45000 gamma
4.04 5.46 12.73
3.41 4.33 11.56
45000
1% 4.42 4.75 12.58
4.19 4.22 12.78
45000
4% 7.22 4.94 12.60
7.36 4.80 13.47
45000
10% 13.65 4.37 18.16
13.67 4.31 18.29
Note: B, C, and D represent the quota, depth limit, and combined quota and depth limit, respectively for
salinity and quantity management. The profit percentage gain is the gain over the open-access (with
salinity) scenario. The gain is higher when there is a severe issue of saltwater intrusion.
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Table 3.4 shows that the severity of salinity signifies the need for different
policies. At lower severity, the depth limit creates higher profits. Compared to openaccess at a higher groundwater salinity, the depth limit has 4.33% more profit; whereas,
the profit gains from combined quota and depth is 11.56%. With the increased TDS
concentration, the combination of both quota and depth limit performs better. Similar to
Katic and Grafton (2011), our findings show that the joint policy of well depth limit and
extraction limit results in higher profits and resilience.
Open access attracts not only too many firms but also too many capitals per firm
(Townsend, 1985). Sayre and Taraz (2019) find that farmers may invest more for well
deepening when the well capacity goes down due to over-extraction. There will be a
devastating impact if farmers invest in deep boring if there is a salinity issue like in
MRAA. Compared to deep wells, shallow wells always yield higher profits when there is
an inland groundwater salinity issue (Asghar et al., 2002; Katic and Grafton, 2011). If
the aquifer is shallow, like the MRAA, then there would be a tradeoff between the
economic payoff and resilience. Limiting the well depth in a shallow aquifer dries the
well in the early time horizon of management.
3.8. Conclusions
The common pool nature of groundwater incurs both extraction externality and
environmental externality (Ostrom et al., 1994). Though Gisser and Sanchez (1980) say
that there would not be a significant difference in welfare gains from optimal
groundwater management and open access, the recent groundwater literature centered
on quality and quantity management shows the need for groundwater management

72

policy to internalize those externalities. Groundwater management policy should
balance the short-run cost of limited extraction to the long-run profit of water availabilityimproved quality.
Water is a free good in Louisiana. Reduction in groundwater head and saltwater
intrusion are rising issues in the MRAA. I evaluated the optimal extraction path, well life,
and profits gain under effective groundwater management policy instruments: quota,
well depth limit, and combined quota and well depth limit. I compared the outcomes
against the open-access scenario.
I introduced a hydro-economic model that encompasses both the quantity and
quality aspects of groundwater. There is a tradeoff between the quality and quantity
extracted (Roseta-Palma, 2002; 2003). Higher extraction invites saltwater intrusion and
ultimately affects the crop yield. The difference in profits under salinity and no salinity
scenarios (A and E) showed that the losses due to salinity range from $0.97 to $1.82
billion (14.82% to 32%) over the 100-year horizon. The optimal extraction path for the
quota was lower than the other instruments and the baseline scenario. The profit gained
from quota was also lower than the profit gained from other instruments. However, the
number of dry wells was higher in the cases where profits were higher, which showed
the tradeoff between economic payoffs and resilience.
The depth limit resulted in a higher profit when the salinity concentration at the
FW-SW interface was lower. Nevertheless, the higher number of dry wells in the depth
limit scenario showed its drawback. At a higher saltwater concentration, a combination
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of quota and depth limit resulted in a higher profit gain and the number of dry wells was
also low. As shown in Katic and Grafton (2011), I found that the gains from joint well
depth limit and quantity limit were higher than other instruments and baseline scenarios.
Short term profit maximizers do not monitor groundwater salinity. They are
unaware of the relationship between groundwater salinity and their farming behavior,
including pumping. Moreover, they do not have a clear idea of reduced crop yield due to
groundwater salinity. They have to experience yield reduction due to salinity to respond
differently. The yield reduction could be worse if salt accumulates in agricultural land.
Groundwater application and its impact on the dynamic accumulation of salt in soil can
be further explored to estimate the welfare across the aquifer region.
The impact of salinity can be minimized by adopting different water conservation
techniques, changing crop mix, and adopting salt-tolerant crop varieties. Changes in
crop choice decision and technology adoption as the salinity level changes should be
explored in the future.
Since quota creates more resilience effects on well life, the transferability aspect
of quota can be explored to gain efficiency. Farm benefits can be increased with the
allocation of the resources to efficient farms. In fisheries literature, stock conservation
and economic efficiency are achieved through ITQ (Individual Transferable Quota) for
sustainable resource management (Branch, 2009; Chu, 2009; Péreau et al., 2012). The
US Sulphur-dioxide allowance trading scheme was also a successful quota system to
reduce acid rain (Stavins, 1998). The transferable quota for groundwater management
enhances food security (Pereau et al., 2018). The duration of holding quota could be for
a certain period or in perpetuity (Montginoul et al., 2016; Wheeler et al., 2016),
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depending upon the national or state-level regulation. The joint effect of transferable
quota and depth limit could be an explorable research area in the future. Of course, this
requires delineating a specific regional level policy based on water quality and water
quantity rather than an aquifer level policy.
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CHAPTER 4. POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CROP MIX AND
GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION IN THE MISSISSIPPI
RIVER ALLUVIAL AQUIFER (MRAA), LOUISIANA
4.1. Introduction
In many parts of the world, groundwater is a reliable and sustainable source of water for
irrigation. In the U.S., groundwater extraction for irrigation purposes has steadily
increased. For example, the groundwater share in irrigation consumption increased by
0.3 billion gallons per day in 2015 compared to 2000 (Hutson et al., 2004; Dieter et al.,
2018). An increase in water use in agriculture could be due to both intensive (more
irrigation water uses per unit of land) and extensive (irrigated area expansion) marginal
adjustments of the irrigated land. To maximize returns, farmers generally switch
cultivation to high-value crops such as corn and soybeans that require more water.
From 2000 to 2020, the land area allocated under corn and soybeans has increased
from 80 million acres and 74 million acres to 90 million acres and 83.5 million acres,
respectively (USDA-National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2020). The expanding
irrigated areas and cultivation of more water-intensive crops have resulted in severe
groundwater depletion around the country. Groundwater conservation measures can
substantially decrease groundwater use and reduce pumping cost. Therefore, the main
objective of this essay is to assess the potential economic impacts of crop mix and
groundwater conservation on farm profits.
The expansion of irrigated crop area overlying the Mississippi River Alluvial
Aquifer (MRAA) (Figure 1.2), a confined aquifer, has affected its economic use. Almost
80% of Louisiana corn acreage and 65% of soybean acreage overlay the MRAA
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region (USDA-Farm Service Agency, 2019). Moreover, 88% of the total MRAA water
budget (338 million gallons per day in 2015) is used to irrigate corn and soybean fields
(Collier, 2018).
In Louisiana, where almost all crop areas depend on gravity to spread extracted
groundwater, the use of poly pipe-based furrow irrigation covers 397,459 acres. Furrow
irrigation is cheaper compared to other irrigation methods, but it uses more water. The
water use efficiency of furrow irrigation is as low as 40%; that can be improved with an
efficient22 irrigation approach (USDA-Natural Resources Conservation Service
Louisiana, 2020). A viable water conservation policy or efficient irrigation technology
could reduce the pumping amount and extend the economic life of the aquifer. Adoption
of a surge valve or skip-row furrow irrigation technique could save around 12% to 20%
water with no compromise on crop yield in the MRAA region (Adusumilli et al., 2016;
Gautam, 2019; USDA-Natural Resources Conservation Service Louisiana, 2020). Other
irrigation methods, such as central pivot or drip irrigation, conserve more water
compared to furrow irrigation (Camp, 1998; Ayars et al., 1999).
There are private, state, and federal sources that provide technical and financial
assistance to farmers for water conservation. According to the 2017 U.S. Census of
Agriculture, a higher proportion of Louisiana respondents received technical and
financial assistance from USDA programs for water conservation and environmental

22

Efficient irrigation=

𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑

(Burt et al., 1997)
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protection (Table 4.1) (USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2018). However,
certain barriers would not allow farmers to reduce energy use or conserve water (Table
4.2) (USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2018). The Census of Agriculture
Table 4.1. Technical and financial assistance received during the past five years for
irrigation or drainage improvements (USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service,
2018).
Source
Farms Farms receiving Farms
technical
receiving
assistance
financial
assistance
USDA programs for water conservation 266
194
239
and environmental protection
Other USDA programs for stewardship
129
52
116
(CSP) or easement (CRP, WRP)
Non-USDA federal programs
41
41
State programs
54
39
41
Private business
125
84
67
Total
403
278
331
Note: USDA provides both financial and technical assistance to conserve groundwater through different
programs.

Table 4.2. Barriers to making improvements to reduce energy use or conserve water
(USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2018)
Barriers
Farms Acres
irrigated
Investigating improvements not a priority
321
115,149
Risk of reduced yield or poorer crop quality
182
118,483
Physical field/crop condition limit system improvements
196
129,372
Improvements will not reduce costs enough to cover
274
178,780
installation cost
Cannot finance improvements
281
168,573
Landlord will not share in cost
230
163,759
Uncertainty about future availability of water
32
26,226
Will not be farming this operation long enough to justify
157
88,545
improvements
Improvements will increase management cost
131
77,807
Total
1,048 525,688
Note: The higher acres of Louisiana irrigated land still have a barrier of covering installation costs.

data shows that the cost of adoption of efficient irrigation technology may be much
higher than the profit obtained from the adoption. There is a need for financial
assistance to farmers to adopt practices that conserve water and energy. Enrollment of
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more farms to the conservation program would conserve groundwater and increase the
returns from groundwater irrigated land. Such programs provide cost-share assistance
to farmers to adopt long term conservation technology (USDA-Natural Resources
Conservation Service, 2018). Investment in efficient irrigation technology would reduce
groundwater withdrawal.
Without reducing the irrigated acreage, farmers can also adjust the frequency
(keeping the same volume of each irrigation as the previous year) or volume of water
used in irrigation. Some agricultural programs such as the Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP) and the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP),
encourage farmers to apply irrigation water efficiently with a lower rate or less frequency
(USDA-Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2020), thus those are expected to
help in conserving groundwater (Fereres and Soriano, 2007; Geerts and Raes, 2009;
Farooq et al., 2019). Farmers use different measures to decide the irrigation schedule in
Louisiana (Table 4.3) (USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2018). Some
methods, such as plant moisture sensing and computer simulation methods, are more
advanced and efficient methods to schedule irrigation. However, the percentage of
farms using those techniques is below 1%.
The effect of agricultural policies on crop acreage allocation and groundwater
withdrawal could go either way. Incentive-based groundwater conservation programs
such as Agricultural Management Assistance (AMA) may encourage farmers to allocate
more acreage to water-intensive profitable crops (Pfeiffer and Lin, 2014a;
Congressional Research Service, 2016); however, some other policies, such as the
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Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) or Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP),
may reduce crop acreage under more water-intensive crops (USDA-Natural Resources
Conservation Service, 2018; 2020).
Table 4.3. Methods used by Louisiana farmers in deciding when to irrigate their farm
(USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2018)
Methods
Number of
farms
Condition of crop
1,695
Feel of soil
701
Soil moisture sensing device
205
Plant moisture sensing device
23
Commercial or government
47
scheduling services
Reports on daily crop-water
48
evapotranspiration
Scheduled by the water supplier
2
Personal calendar schedule
257
Computer simulation methods
15
When neighbors begin to irrigate
15
Note: A higher proportion of farm decides the irrigation scheduling with the conventional scheduling
method. Adoption of more recent and reliable technologies such as sensing device and computer
simulation methods are very low.

Inefficient allocation or over-extraction of groundwater increases total pumping
cost or reduces the guarantee that good water quality from the aquifer will be available
in the future. With the increased distance between the ground surface and the aquifersurface, the need to install deeper wells to extract water becomes eminent. The total
energy required to pump water is also higher as the aquifer level declines. Water
extraction cost increases with expanded crop acreage, specifically when crops require
more water. Therefore, the energy cost is a recurring significant component in
groundwater extraction.
The price of agricultural commodities and policy changes are the major factors
affecting land-use decisions by farmers (Feng and Babcock, 2010). Crop mix and crop
acreage in Louisiana have been fluctuating annually (LSU AgCenter, 2020). From 2005
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to 2008, corn price increased from $2 per bushel to nearly $8 per bushel. During the
same period, the corn area increased by 133%, and the cotton area decreased by 47%
(USDA-National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2018). The reason for the higher corn
price in the U.S. was the Energy Policy Act, 2005 (Roberts and Schlenker, 2009). The
policy has surged the demand for corn. To meet the higher demand, farmers intensively
used inputs such as land, water, and energy, which have adversely affected the
environment (Beman et al., 2005; Fargione et al., 2008; Searchinger et al., 2008;
Motamed et al., 2016). With the given set of predetermined price and crop choice, the
most commonly used agricultural supply response model assumes that farmers
primarily care for profit maximization (French and Matthews, 1971; Yu et al., 2012;
Karali et al., 2020). However, there are some environmental and agronomic constraints,
such as previous land use choice, pest and disease, and soil health, that could play a
major role in changing land productivity. Within the same piece of land, farmers may
cultivate different crops in different periods to obtain maximum profits.
The prediction of production choices is important to formulate policy and to
account for the environmental consequences of agricultural policies. Ex post
assessment of the outcome of the water conservation strategy requires an economic
model capable of providing future crop choice as well as estimating the returns at a farm
level. In this study, I use micro-level data and develop a choice prediction model to
capture the agricultural land-use changes and access the environmental and economic
consequences.
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In this essay, I assume different groundwater conservation scenarios that could
be the result of the adoption of efficient irrigation technologies. I assume farmers
conserve groundwater by 5%, 10%, 20%, and 30% of what they would generally apply
for irrigation (Perry, 2006; USDA-Natural Resources Conservation Service Louisiana,
2020). The returns from groundwater irrigated land vary as those conserved amounts
vary. The evaluation of conservation policy scenarios before legislative actions may
help in formulating appropriate strategies that minimize economic damage in the
targeted agricultural region.
A novel aspect of my work is to combine the results from econometric and
machine learning tools for policy analysis. The main contribution of this essay is to
define how crop-mix and groundwater conservation affect the returns from the irrigated
land in the future. In the data section, I describe data collection techniques used in the
paper. I use various sources to get the data on crop acreage, crop choice, agricultural
commodity prices, and energy prices. A MODFLOW model developed for the MRAA
region gives us the groundwater height that changes at different pumping rates. I
estimate the future returns from the irrigated land from 2020 to 2022. I use a vector
autoregressive (VAR) model to forecast the price for agricultural commodities and
different energy sources. Farmers’ pumping behaviors depend on crop choice. To
predict crop choice, I use different machine learning tools. In the results and discussion
section, I show that groundwater conservation could reduce extraction costs
substantially at the aquifer level within the three years of the study’s duration.
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Government policy to assist farmers financially and technically would help farmers to
conserve groundwater. In the conclusion section, I propose some future work that
should be explored.
4.2. Data
I focus on ten northeast Louisiana parishes (Avoyelles, Catahoula, Concordia, East
Carroll, Franklin, Madison, Morehouse, Richland, Tensas, and West Carroll) overlying
the Mississippi River Alluvial Aquifer (MRAA) (Figure 1.1). I obtain groundwater well
information from the Strategic Online Natural Resources Information System (SONRIS)
and the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (LDNR). The information on active
wells from 2004 to 2019 contains the diameter and location of the wells. For these same
years, I compile the area under corn, cotton, rice, and soybean from NASS CropScape Cropland Data Layers (CDL). I overlay the CDL information with the information from
SONRIS to identify crop choice and acreage allocated at an individual well level. To
avoid the problem of acreage overestimation, I compare the CDL irrigated area to the
average area that a well with a one-inch diameter irrigates based on the survey
conducted by our research group.
Our research group surveyed Louisiana farmers in 2015 and 2016 to understand
row crop irrigation practices in the state. Based on the information from those surveys, I
find that an inch of well casing diameter, on average, can irrigate eight acres of corn
and soybean, ten acres of cotton, and nine acres of rice. If the diameter based well
capacity as obtained from the surveys is smaller than the area from the CDL, then I
consider the diameter based well capacity as the irrigated area (Figure 4.1, Case 1). If
the CDL area is smaller than the well capacity, then the CDL area is considered as the
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irrigated area (Figure 4.1, Case 2). If I have multiple wells of different diameters within a
land parcel, the summation of their irrigation capacity is used to identify the irrigated
area (Figure 4.1, Case 3) as long as the area is below the CDL identified irrigated
areas. If the summation of the capacities of many wells is greater than the CDL area
(Figure 4.1, Case 4), then I determine the irrigated area as:
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑖 ′ 𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦

𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑖 = 𝐶𝐷𝐿 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 ∗ (𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦)

(4 − 1)

In summary, my approach is shown below:
Case 1: CDL area > irrigation area based on the well diameter → I use irrigation
area based on the well diameter.
Case 2: CDL area < irrigation area based on the well diameter → I use irrigation
area based on the CDL area.
Case 3: CDL area > irrigation area based on the well diameter of multiple wells→
I use irrigation area based on the well diameter.
Case 4: CDL area < irrigation area based on the well diameter of multiple wells→
I use irrigation area based on the weighted area given in equation (4-1).
The overall irrigated acreage of the entire MRAA region between 2004-2019 is
given in Figure 4.2. In this study, I considered only those wells that have been used to
irrigate four row crops. I also require that these wells not to have remained inactive
continuously for more than three years in the past. Irrigated acreage in the study area
follows a similar trend to the MRAA irrigated region (Figure 4.3). The irrigated area
allocated under different crops in the study region has been changing over time.
Acreage under corn and soybean increased after 2006 and 2007, respectively, primarily
because of the Energy Policy Act, 2005. The policy raised the corn-based ethanol and
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Figure 4.1. Different cases for well diameter and area for irrigation. Case 1 and Case 2:
single well case, Case 3 and Case 4: multiple well case. The area under the dark circle
is the well capacity. The yellow areas in Case 1, 3, and 4 are the CDL area for the corn
and red area in Case 2 is the CDL area for cotton.
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Figure 4.2. Area allocation under major crops in the MRAA. Corn and soybean are the
two major crops in the MRAA region.
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Irrigated Acreage in the Study Region
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Figure 4.3. Area allocation under major crops in the study area. Allocation trends in the
study area are similar to the trend of the entire MRAA region. Both corn and soybean
are the dominating crops in the study area.
soybean-based biodiesel demand; therefore, the corn and soybean price also increased
(Figure 4.4). I obtain prices of crops grown in Louisiana between 1980 and 2019 from
the National Agricultural Statistics Services (NASS), USDA. The maximum per acre
yield for corn, cotton, rice, and soybean in Louisiana under irrigation are 195 Bushel,
1270 lb., 72 cwt., and 62 Bushel, respectively (LSU AgCenter, 2019).
Energy is one of the major inputs for irrigation. I obtained the energy price (19852019) from the United States Energy Information Administration (U.S. Energy
Information Administration, 2020). The price of electricity is always higher than the price
of diesel and natural gas (Figure 4.5). Moreover, there is a correlation among different
energy prices (i.e., per unit price of natural gas, electricity, and diesel). Therefore, I
included the price of all three sources in my econometric analysis. Given the diesel
price lies between the price of natural gas and electricity, I assume that farmers use
diesel to extract groundwater in the study area.
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Figure 4.4. Price of agricultural commodities from 1980 to 2019. Corn and soybean
prices increase after the Energy Policy Act, 2005.
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Figure 4.5. Per kWh price of electricity, gasoline, and natural gas from 1994 to 2019.
Groundwater height is an important component in estimating pumping costs. The
groundwater model developed by Karakullukcu (2018) has 12 structural layers in the
MRAA. Wells for agricultural purposes are drilled up to the 8th layer (up to 150 feet),
although most current agricultural wells in the region are within the range of 30 to 100
feet. The total pumping volume of the current year is generally used to estimate the

87

groundwater head the following year. I obtain the surface elevation and initial
groundwater height of individual wells from the groundwater model. More details on the
model can be found in Karakullukcu (2018).
I assume that each well belongs to a unique farmer. Farmers plant one crop per
year. They may leave the land fallow to minimize the loss from pest infestation or any
agronomic constraints that come with continuous farming. Overall, an individual farmer
decides upon a single choice from the following set (corn, cotton, rice, soybean, fallow).

Figure 4.6. The MRAA groundwater model. It has 12 different layers. Considering layer
1 just beneath the ground, agricultural wells are drilled up to the 8th layers (up to 150
feet). Most of the agricultural wells lie between 30 to 100 feet in depth.
Given that I am considering 2,572 wells from 2004 to 2019, there are 205,760 possible
choices that farmers can make. Table 4.4 shows the number of farmers making the
respective crop choice decision based on CDL data. A few observations are striking.
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For example, in 2004, 788 farmers left their land fallow. In recent years, the number of
fallow land parcels is decreasing. Farmers switching to corn in 2007 almost increased
by four times from 2006. Rice is the least cultivated crop in the MRAA region.
Interestingly, the number of soybean land parcels decreased in 2019, perhaps due to
the trade dispute with China, a major U.S. soybean importing country (American
Soybean Association, 2018). China reduced import of the U.S. soybean by 56.5% in
2020 compared to 2019 (Agri Pulse, 2020). The price of soybean also decreased after
2016.
Table 4.4. CDL land parcel and crop choice between 2004 and 2019.
Year
Corn
Cotton
Fallow
Rice Soybeans
2004
443
563
788
115
663
2005
419
992
289
203
669
2006
331
898
443
87
813
2007
1,227
316
459
108
462
2008
995
324
379
110
764
2009
1,080
146
176
169
1,001
2010
1,077
146
182
167
1,000
2011
1,123
268
205
94
882
2012
1,084
186
234
59
1,009
2013
1,366
56
250
46
854
2014
688
106
203
81
1,494
2015
712
56
135
91
1,578
2016
995
71
195
82
1,229
2017
601
69
744
28
1,130
2018
810
180
77
68
1,437
2019
973
320
412
81
786
Note After 2006, the number of corn land parcels increased dramatically. The corn demand was higher
after the Energy Policy Act, 2005. As a consequence, the cotton area decreased.

To estimate the returns from the groundwater irrigated land under different water
conservation scenarios, information on the farmers’ crop choice decisions are very
important. I use different econometric and machine learning models to predict farmers’
crop choice decisions between 2020 and 2022. The prediction of the crop choice
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decision is more accurate if the cropping patterns of previous years are included.
Unobserved individual heterogeneity resulting from soil, micro-environment, and farmspecific characteristics impacting the productivity and profitability may not be explained
by farm output price or other economic variables. Thus, the choice prediction model is
useful in capturing the unobserved heterogeneity in the land-use decision at the farm
level. I estimate the total water required per season at a farm for a particular crop based
on irrigated acreage, crop choice, irrigation frequency, and irrigation rate (Tacker and
Vories, 2000; Tacker et al., 2008; Vories and Barnes, 2012; Ort and Long, 2014). I
assume farmers make the decision based on the set of choices provided. I also assume
that irrigated area and per acre crop yield from 2020 to 2022 is similar to the area and
per acre crop yield in 2019.23
4.3. Model
Louisiana farmers do not pay for groundwater quantity other than the extraction cost. I
assume that they extract water until the marginal cost of groundwater extraction equals
the marginal revenue or the well dries out. Total returns from groundwater irrigated land
depends on the crop choice, prices of the crop outputs, per acre crop yield, and the
energy cost required to pump groundwater.
2

𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽 𝑡 (𝑝𝑗𝑡 ∙ 𝐴𝑖 ∙ 𝑌𝑖𝑗 − 𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑞𝑖 ∙ (ℎ𝑒𝑖 − ℎ𝑖𝑡 ))

(4 − 2)

𝑡=0

where 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the total return from the irrigated land at location 𝑖 for crop 𝑗 in year
𝑡; 𝛽 is the discount factor at 4% discount rate; 𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the price of the crop output; 𝐴𝑖 is

23

If the land parcel is fallow in both years 2020 and 2019, I consider the area of 2018.
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the area of irrigated land; 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the crop yield; 𝐶𝑡 is the energy cost to extract one cubic
meter of water from one-meter depth; 𝑞𝑖 is the total volume of water extracted; ℎ𝑒𝑖 is the
groundwater elevation; and ℎ𝑖𝑡 is the groundwater height. The total energy cost for
groundwater extraction depends on the depth of the water table, energy price 24, and the
amount of groundwater volume pumped. The crop yield for crop 𝑗, 𝑌𝑖𝑗 , after the
modification of Jensen (1968), Nairizi and Rydzewski (1977), and Rao et al. (1988)’s
water and crop yield relation is defined as
𝑞

𝑖
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑌𝑗𝑀𝑎𝑥 ∗ 𝑓 (𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥
)

(4 − 3)

𝑖𝑗

𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑞𝑖𝑗 is the volume of water that farmers applied in the field and 𝑞𝑖𝑗
is the maximum

amount of water required for the maximum yield. The relative yield percentage,
𝑞

𝑖
𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑓 (𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥
) = 𝑦𝑖𝑗
, is based on the water-yield relation of different crops. I assume that
𝑖𝑗

𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑌𝑗𝑀𝑎𝑥 when farmers adopt an efficient irrigation technology/system. With the
current irrigation system (furrow irrigation), which I assume is not efficient, the wateryield relation for corn (University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2013; Trout and DeJonge, 2017),
cotton (Lindsay, 2010; USDA-Agricultural Research Service, 2019), rice (Bastiaanssen
and Steduto, 2017), and soybean (P. Tracker and Vories, 2000; Payero et al., 2005;
Sharda et al., 2019) are such that:
2

𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛:

𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑦𝑖𝑗

𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑞𝑖𝑗
= 0.3938 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) + 0.0202 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) + 0.64
𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑞𝑖𝑗

(4 − 4)

2

𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑛:

24

𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑦𝑖𝑗

𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑞𝑖𝑗
= 0.2519 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) − 0.1901 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) + 0.88
𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑞𝑖𝑗

(4 − 5)

I use diesel price as the energy price. One gallon of U.S. diesel is equivalent to 40.7 kWh energy.
Extraction of one-acre foot of water from one-foot depth requires 1.02kwh energy (Dale, 2016).
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2

𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑒:

𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑦𝑖𝑗

𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑞𝑖𝑗
= 0.2054 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) + 0.8121 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 )
𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑞𝑖𝑗

(4 − 6)

2

𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠:

𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑦𝑖𝑗

𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑞𝑖𝑗
= 0.6272 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) − 0.3079 ( 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) + 0.66
𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑞𝑖𝑗

(4 − 7)

𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
For corn, cotton, and soybean: 0 < 𝑦𝑖𝑗
≤ 1, whereas for rice: 0 ≤ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤ 1.

The simulation of the groundwater model developed for the MRAA gives the relation
between the groundwater head and water withdrawal. I select sensitive 25 wells across
the MRAA regions and average the sensitivity value given as
ℎ𝑖𝑡+1 = ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 𝑞𝑖𝑡 ∗ 2 ∗ 𝜑 ∗ 10−6

(4 − 8)

1

where 𝜑 = (𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟)2 .
Multiple factors affect the crop choice decision. The price of the commodity and
the historical crop choices are the major motivational factors for decision-makers. The
empirical price modeling approach for the agricultural market could be structural or nonstructural (Myers et al., 2010). The structural approach is an econometric estimation
using the theory of microeconomics. The nonstructural approach uses the historical
correlation of the time series data. The non-structural approach may not be the exact
representation of the demand and supply curve for the direct economic explanation, but
the forecasted commodity price represents the market expectation and has the potential
to alter the farming decision.
I forecast energy and crop output prices using the vector autoregressive (VAR)
model. The energy consumption model is used to calculate the total pumping cost. The
forecasted crop price is used as an input in the choice prediction model. I predict crop

25

Groundwater heads decline very fast in sensitive wells when water is extracted.
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choice as a function of per acre total revenue of the crop, location, and the last three
years’ crop choice on the same parcel of land. Predicted crop choice is used to
calculate the volume of the groundwater pump and the total returns from the irrigated
land.
4.3.1. Price forecasting model
4.3.1.1. VAR model
VAR is a multivariate forecasting technique used when two or more time-series
variables influence each other. The VAR model of order p for four crop output prices is
shown as follows:
𝑤𝑡 = 𝛼10 + 𝛼11 𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝛼12 𝑤𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝛼1𝑝 𝑤𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛽12 𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛾12 𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛿12 𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑤 (4 − 9)
𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼20 + 𝛼21 𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛼22 𝑥𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝛼2𝑝 𝑥𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛽22 𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛾22 𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝛿22 𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑥 (4 − 10)
𝑦
𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼30 + 𝛼31 𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛼32 𝑛𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝛼3𝑝 𝑛𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛽32 𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛾32 𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝛿32 𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 (4 − 11)

𝑧𝑡 = 𝛼40 + 𝛼41 𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝛼42 𝑧𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝛼4𝑝 𝑧𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛽42 𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛾42 𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝛿42 𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑧 (4 − 12)
In VAR, from a set of time series variables, 𝑣 = (𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑛, 𝑐𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑛, 𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒, 𝑠𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛) =
(𝑤, 𝑥, 𝑛, 𝑧), one of the variables is assigned as a dependent variable and the lags of the
variable are independent variables. 𝛼𝑖𝑗 , 𝛽𝑖𝑗 , 𝛾𝑖𝑗 , and 𝛿𝑖𝑗 are the parameters for the crop
price variables.
I assume that the error term is 𝜀𝑡𝑣 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣2 ) and 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑡𝑣 , 𝜀𝑡𝑣 ) = 𝜎𝑣𝑣
The first criterion for building the VAR model is to test the influence of one variable on
other variables. The null hypothesis that one time series is not useful in forecasting
another can be tested by Granger’s causality test.
The hypothesis for the Granger causality test is
𝐻𝑜 : the coefficients of the lags of a variable in an equation are zero
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𝐻1 : at least one of the lags is not equal to zero.
In the autoregressive model, each variable is influenced by its lagged effects. The price
of a commodity at period 𝑡 is a function of its lagged price and the lagged prices of the
other commodities. AIC and BIC criteria are used to select the lag order of the model
(Hamilton, 1994; Hill et al., 2011). If the time series variables are stationary, the whole
system of the equation can be estimated with a least squared estimation. If variables
are not stationary, pth order differences are taken.
4.3.2. Choice prediction models
Machine learning tools such as multinomial logit, random forests, decision trees,
and neural networks are generally used in classification problems to predict choice. The
choice of a crop for the following year is given as
𝑠𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑠𝑖𝑡 , 𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 , 𝑠𝑖𝑡−2 , 𝑇𝑅𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 , 𝑙𝑎, 𝑙𝑜)

(4 − 13)

where 𝑠 is the choice from a set, 𝑀 = (corn, cotton, rice, soybean, and fallow) at location 𝑖
and time 𝑡, 𝑇𝑅𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 is per acre total revenue of the commodity at time 𝑡, and 𝑙𝑎 and 𝑙𝑜
are latitude and longitude, respectively.
4.3.2.1. Multinomial logit
Multinomial logit (MNL) is one of the most widely used discrete choice models
(McFadden, 1973; Matějka and McKay, 2015). The probability of a choice or an
alternative is independent of the characteristics of other alternatives (McFadden, 1973).
The probability of farmer, 𝑖, choosing crop, 𝑐, is given as
𝑒 𝛽𝑐𝑋𝑖
𝑃𝑖𝑐 = 𝑁 𝛽 𝑋
∑𝑐 𝑒 𝑐 𝑖

(4 − 14)

where the vector of the observed explanatory variable of farmer, 𝑖, is 𝑿𝑖 and 𝛽𝑐 is the
parameter associated with 𝑋.
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4.3.2.2. Decision tree
A decision tree is a nonparametric approach that does not require strict assumptions
regarding the distribution and functional form of the data. It can handle both categorical
and continuous variables in the analysis and also explains the nonlinear relationship
between input variables (Hampson and Volper, 1986; Fayyad and Irani, 1992). The
formulation of the decision tree can be divided into ;3root nodes, internodes, and
leaves. The data set is recursively partitioned into subdivisions on the basis of tests
defined at each node of the tree and ultimately each leaf (the terminal node) is assigned
with a choice correspondence to every observation (Figure 4.7).

Figure 4.7. Structure of a decision tree. At each node, a test, T, is applied that
recursively subdivide the dataset. A, B, and C represent the choice assigned to each
observation at leaves. Source: (Friedl and Brodley, 1997).
To build the classification tree, in the beginning, this method stratifies the feature
space. The possible values of input variables 𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , … , 𝑋𝑝 are stratified into a distinct
non-overlapping region 𝐽 = {𝑅1 , 𝑅2 , … , 𝑅𝐽 }. A prediction is made for every observation
based on the region where it lies. The mode of the response value under the region
𝑅𝑗 on the training set is used for the prediction for the test set. In both regression and
classification problems, trees are grown on the basis of recursive binary splitting.
However, the criteria for making a binary split for both problems are different. The
95

regression problem involves the residual sum of squares (RSS), whereas the
classification problem uses the Gini index, Entropy, and the classification error rate
(James et al., 2013). Since the Gini index and entropy improve the purity, either of them
is more commonly used for evaluating split quality than the error classification rate.
The Gini index is given as
𝐾

𝐺 = ∑ 𝑝̂ 𝑚𝑘 (1 − 𝑝̂𝑚𝑘 )

(4 − 15)

𝑘=1

Where 𝑝̂𝑚𝑘 is the proportion of the observation in the training data lying in the 𝑚𝑡ℎ
region in the 𝑘 𝑡ℎ class. 𝐺 gives an estimation of total variance across the 𝐾 classes. If
𝑝̂𝑚𝑘 , 0 ≤ 𝑝̂ 𝑚𝑘 ≤ 1, is close to the lower or upper bound, then the value of the Gini index
is low. The lower Gini index notifies that the node contains the observations from a
single class. Therefore, the Gini index is a measure of node purity.
Entropy is an alternative to the Gini index, which is given as
𝐾

𝐸 = − ∑ 𝑝̂ 𝑚𝑘 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝̂ 𝑚𝑘

(4 − 16)

𝑘=1

where 0 ≤ −𝑝̂ 𝑚𝑘 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝̂ 𝑚𝑘 . Numerically, Entropy is similar to the Gini index.
However, to estimate the prediction accuracy of the pruned tree, the classification error
rate is used. It is the fraction of the training observation that does not appear in the most
widely occurring class, given as
𝐶 = 1 − max 𝑝̂𝑚𝑘
𝑘
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(4 − 17)

4.3.2.3. Random forest
In the classification problem, prediction performance can be improved by aggregating
many decision trees. Random forest constructs a powerful prediction model on the
basis of building blocks that consist of many decision trees (Breiman, 2001). Trees are
selected randomly with replacement, also known as a bagging-based approach, to build
a forest of classification trees. The procedure starts with bootstrap sampling. Around
63% of the dataset is selected randomly (Cutler et al., 2007). Observations that do not
appear in the selected samples are out-of-bag observations. In the process of building
decision trees, a random sample of 𝑙 predictors is selected from the total 𝑝 predictors.
Generally, 𝑙 is considered as √𝑝. The strongly correlated predictor is selected in the top
splits. Unlike bagging, random forest avoids the correlation of the predictions. Random
forest reduces the number of correlated predictors and gives better results (James et
al., 2013). After fitting the tree in each randomly selected sample, a fully-grown tree is
used to predict the out-of-bag observations. Predicted class is obtained from the
majority vote of out of bag predictions. Out-of-bag predictions are also used to calculate
the average accuracy and error rates.
4.3.2.4. Artificial neural network-multi layer perceptron
Multi-layer perceptron (MLP) is well known for its fast operation, easy implementation,
and better performance even in small training data (Subasi, 2007; Übeyli, 2009). It has
three sequential layers: input, hidden, and output layer (Figure 4.8). Input information is
processed and transmitted to the output layer through the hidden layers. The linearly
summarized weighted value (𝑤1 𝑥1 , 𝑤2 𝑥2 , … 𝑤𝑛 𝑥𝑛 ) is transformed from previous input
layers to forward layers through hidden layers followed by the non-linear activation
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functions. In the classification problem, the activation function is a softmax function
given as
𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑥𝑖 ) =

𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥𝑖 )
𝑘
∑𝑙=1 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥𝑙 )

(4 − 18)

where 𝑥𝑖 is the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ element of inputs and 𝐾 is the number of classes.
It gives a vector of the probabilities that the sample 𝑥 belongs to the class 𝑘. The class
with the higher probability is assigned as the output for that observation in the output
layer. Let 𝑦 be the output with one class from 𝐾, its distribution is given as
𝑝

𝑞

𝑃(𝑦𝑘 |𝑋) = 𝜑 {∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑗 ∙ ℎ (∑ 𝑥𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑗 + 𝑤0𝑗 ) + 𝑣0𝑘 }
𝑗=1

(4 − 19)

𝑖=1

Where 𝑿 is a vector of inputs {𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … , 𝑥𝑛 }, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the weight assigned between the
input and hidden layer, 𝑣𝑖𝑗 is the weight assigned in between the hidden layer and
output, 𝑤0𝑗 and 𝑣0𝑘 are biases, and 𝜑 and ℎ are activation functions at output and input
layers, respectively.

Figure 4.8. Structure of the artificial neural network-multi layer perceptron (MPL). It has
three sequential layers: input, hidden, and output layer. Source: (Sckit-learn, 2020).
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The optimum number of neurons in the hidden layer results in proper fitting.
Though the analytical approach to determine the optimal neurons in the hidden layers is
not available, the trial and error method is more prominent (Oğulata et al., 2009; Haykin,
2010). MLP minimizes the loss function after updating the weights. The loss function is
the cross entropy in MLP for the classification problem, which is given as
𝐻(𝑦, 𝑦̂) = − ∑ 𝑦𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑦̂𝑖 )

(4 − 20)

𝑖

Cross entropy calculates the distance between the original distribution and the
distribution that the model considers.
4.4. Results and Discussions
I find that all price variables are stationary based on the eigenvalues matrix as
described in Hamilton (1994) (Figure 4.9). Granger causality Wald tests are given in
Table 4.5 and Table 4.6. In corn and soybean price equations, lags of cotton price are
statistically significant (Table 4.5). In contrast, neither corn price nor soybean price
Granger-cause cotton price. Similarly, in the energy equation, gasoline and electricity
Granger-cause each other (Table 4.6). Modified Akaike’s information criteria
recommended two lags for agricultural commodity price forecasting (Table 4.7) and one
lag for energy forecasting (Table 4.8). Parameter estimates for agricultural commodity
and energy price forecasting models are given in Table (4.9) and Table (4.10),
respectively. Lags of cotton price significantly affect corn and soybean prices. The price
of the agricultural commodities shows dependencies and co-movements in the long run
(Ai et al., 2006). The demand and supply of the crop determine the agricultural
commodity price. The substitutability nature of corn, cotton, rice, and soybean is
reflected in their prices. Similarly, there is a dynamic linkage between energy prices, so
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energy price depends on substitute or complement price or the alternate source (Batten
et al., 2017). The lagged price of electricity significantly affects the price of all energy
sources.

(a)

(b)

Figure 4.9. Unit root tests. All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. VAR satisfies the
stability condition in (a) crop price forecasting and (b) energy price forecasting model.
The impulse response graph shows the effects of exogenous shock on
endogenous variables (Figures 4.10 and 4.11). A one standard deviation shock
(impulse) to corn price causes the corn price to increase slightly in the first year, but the
effect decreases after one year. An impulse to cotton price causes corn and soybean
prices to increase by about one-tenth percentage point in the first forecasted year. In
the energy price equation, an impulse to gasoline price causes electricity prices to
increase and natural gas price to decrease. A one standard deviation shock to the
natural gas price increases electricity and diesel prices.
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Table 4.5. Granger causality Wald tests for agricultural output price
Prob >
Equation Excluded
F
F
corn
soybean 0.52805 0.5953
corn
rice
2.6301 0.0892
corn
cotton
9.7635 0.0006
corn
ALL
4.3159 0.0031
cotton
cotton
cotton
cotton

corn
soybean
rice
ALL

1.1027
0.30116
3.1919
2.02

0.3455
0.7422
0.0559
0.0951

soybean
soybean
soybean
soybean

corn
rice
cotton
ALL

3.842
0.59065
3.9154
2.2129

0.0331
0.5605
0.0312
0.0704

rice
rice
rice
rice

corn
soybean
cotton
ALL

1.1693
0.9055
1.5635
2.82

0.3248
0.4155
0.2265
0.0276

Note: The null hypothesis of the Granger causality test states that there is no effect of a time series
variable on another in forecasting. The unidirectional Granger causality is from cotton to corn, cotton to
soybean, and corn to soybean.

Table 4.6. Granger causality Wald tests for energy price
Equation
Excluded
𝜒2
electricity
gasoline
4.3683
electricity
natural_gas
1.2758
electricity
ALL
10.494

Prob > 𝜒 2
0.037
0.259
0.005

gasoline
gasoline
gasoline

electricity
natural_gas
ALL

5.4928
1.77
7.0237

0.019
0.183
0.03

natural_gas
natural_gas
natural_gas

electricity
gasoline
ALL

8.6544
2.0492
9.4424

0.003
0.152
0.009

Note: The null hypothesis of the Granger causality test states that there is no effect of a time series
variable on another in forecasting. The bidirectional Granger causality is from gasoline to electricity and
unidirectional is from electricity to natural gas.
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Table 4.7. Lag selection for the price forecast
lag
df
p
FPE
0

AIC

HQIC

SBIC

1.10E-10

-11.5949

-11.5335

-11.419

1

16

0

2.50E-11

-13.088

-12.781*

-12.2083*

2

16

0.001

2.1e-11*

-13.2833*

-12.7306

-11.6997

3

16

0.104

2.90E-11

-13.0441

-12.2458

-10.7568

4

16

0.002

3.10E-11

-13.1691

-12.1251

-10.178

Note: The maximum lag order is 2 selected on the basis of Akaike’s information criterion (AIC).

Table 4.8. Lag selection for the energy price forecast.
Lag
df
p
FPE
AIC
0
1.20E-12
-18.9479
1
9
0
2.3e-15*
-25.1883*
2
9
0.085
2.60E-15
-25.0988
3
9
0.729
4.00E-15
-24.7152
4
9
0.006
3.70E-15
-24.882

HQIC
-18.9026
-25.0073*
-24.7822
-24.2629
-24.2939

SBIC
-18.8091
-24.6332*
-24.1274
-23.3275
-23.078

Note: The maximum lag order is 1 selected on the basis of Akaike’s information criterion (AIC).

Table 4.9. Parameter estimation for agricultural commodity price forecasting VAR
model.
Coef.
SE
P>|z|
corn
corn
L1. 1.124046
.210387
0.000
L2. -.6793932 .2001696
0.001
soybean
L1. -.0594904 .1248313
0.634
L2. .1352353 .1154225
0.241
rice
L1. -.0547137 .1036467
0.598
L2. .2522253 .0998952
0.012
cotton
L1. .0601437 .0150583
0.000
L2. -.0644228 .0157055
0.000
_cons .0151316 .0173261
0.382
soybean
corn
L1. 1.327546 .4221306
0.002
L2. -.5829644 .4016298
0.147
Table 4.9. cont’d.
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soybean
L1.
L2.
rice
L1.
L2.
cotton
L1.
L2.
_cons
rice
corn
L1.
L2.
soybean
L1.
L2.
rice
L1.
L2.
cotton
L1.
L2.
cotton
corn
L1.
L2.
soybean
L1.
L2.
rice
L1.
L2.
cotton
L1.
L2.
_cons

Coef.

SE

P>|z|

.3747294
.1084368

.2504676
.2315892

0.135
0.640

-.0456428
.2380327

.2079617
.2004345

0.826
0.235

.0574083
-.0948262
.0614875

.0302137
.0315123
.0347639

0.057
0.003
0.077

.5723
-.4157809

.3591678
.3417248

0.111
0.224

.3213293
-.1985468

.2131092
.1970465

0.132
0.314

.4219333
.2433213

.1769432
.1705387

0.017
0.154

.0261299
-.0527049

.0257072
.0268121

0.309
0.049

2.767945
-3.092498

2.180558
2.07466

0.204
0.136

.919663
.1447057

1.293816
1.196297

0.477
0.904

-2.251145
2.832612

1.074247
1.035365

0.036
0.006

.4518262
-.1457567
.5555613

.1560718
.16278
.1795765

0.004
0.371
0.002

Note: L1 and L2 are lag 1 and lag 2 orders of the variable lying above L1. The cotton price is statistically
significant in forecasting the corn and soybean price.
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I forecast the crop output and energy prices from 2020 to 2022 (Figures 4.12 and
4.13) based on historical observation of crop price (1980-2019) and energy price (19852019), respectively. Results from the price forecasting model are used to predict the
crop choice decision for the individual farmer. To roughly check how data behaves in
the forecasting model, I split the data into a training set (1980-2016) and a test set
(2017-2019). First, I develop a forecasting model based on a training dataset to forecast
the values for test years. Out of sample forecasting is done yearly with one step
forecasting technique, and the forecasted values fall within the confidence interval
(Figures 4.14 and 4.15).
I compare the prediction accuracy percentage (Table 4.11) obtained from the
different prediction models (MNL, random forest, decision tree, and artificial neural
network). Among all four models, the out of sample prediction accuracy percentage is
highest in the random forest model. The optimal number and depth of decision trees in
the random forest model are 11 and 5, respectively, which give a 54.24% prediction
accuracy (Figure 4.16). In many studies with the classification problem, the random
forest is more stable, has higher accuracy, and is relatively more efficient compared to
artificial neural networks, decision trees, and MNL (Pal, 2005; Lawrence et al., 2006;
Chan and Paelinckx, 2008).
The frequency of farmers planting either corn or soybean in each year is higher
for the predicted three years compared to other choices (Table 4.12). The irrigated area
for corn and soybean is around 7,000 acres in 2019, which increased to anywhere
between 11,000 to 12,000 acres for the predicted years (Table 4.13). I can speculate a
substantial increase in corn and soybean acreage that could be because of relative
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Table 4.10. Parameter estimates of energy price forecasting VAR model. L1 represents
lag 1 of the variable at upper column.
Coef.
S.E.
P>|z|
electricity
electricity
L1.
.8530856 .0253127
0.000
gasoline
L1.

.0525893

.0251618

0.037

natural_gas
L1.

.0739763

.0654945

0.259

_cons
gasoline
electricity
L1.

.0125334

.004441

0.005

-.2199643

.0938542

0.019

gasoline
L1.

.7607174

.0932947

0.000

natural_gas
L1.

.3230783

.2428397

0.183

_cons
.0321105
natural_gas
electricity
L1.
-.1034999

.0164664

0.051

.0351822

0.003

gasoline
L1.

-.0500632

.0349724

0.152

natural_gas
L1.

.8969315

.0910309

0.000

_cons

.0215033

.0061726

0.000

Notes: L1 and L2 are lag 1 and lag 2 orders of the variable. The lagged price of electricity affects the price
of all energy sources.
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Figure 4.10. The impulse-response graph for the crop output price forecasting model.
Impulse is presented in each row and the response is in each column. For example,
var1, cotton, soybean shows that a standard deviation shock in cotton price causes
soybean price to increase by one-tenth percentage in the first forecasted year.

Figure 4.11. The impulse-response graph for energy price forecasting model. One
impulse in each row and a response in each column.
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Figure 4.12. Forecasted agricultural commodity prices based on the historical crop price
data from 1980 to 2019. All price variables are endogenous time series variables.

Figure 4.13. Forecasted energy prices based on the historical crop price data from 1985
to 2019. All price variables are endogenous time series variables.
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Figure 4.14. Out of sample price forecasting for crop price. The data are divided into
training and test sets. The training set contains the date from 1980 to 2016. Test data is
from 2017 to 2019. I build a model in the training set, forecast the price until 2019 based
on the developed model, and compare the forecasted price with the test data
(observed).

Figure 4.15. Out of sample price forecasting for energy price. The data are divided into
training and test sets. The training set contains the date from 1985 to 2016. Test data is
from 2017 to 2019. I build a model in the training set, forecast the price until 2019 based
on the developed model, and compare the forecasted price with the test data
(observed).
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Table 4.11. Prediction accuracy percentage
S.N. Prediction methods
In- sample
prediction
accuracy %
1
Multinomial Logit
57.6
2
Decision tree
84.28
3
Random Forest
60
4
Artificial Neural Network54.74
Multi Layer Perceptron

Out-of-sample prediction
accuracy %
51.8
44.66
54.24
47.38

Note: I split the data into training and test sets. Modes were developed on the training set. In-sample
prediction accuracy is obtained by comparing the observed training set’s output with the predicted output.
A comparison of the observed test set’s output and with the prediction of test set gives the out-of-sample
prediction accuracy. I choose a model with a higher out-of-sample accuracy percentage.

(a)
(b)
Figure 4.16. Optimum (a) number and (b) depth of decision trees in the random forest
model.
Table 4.12. Number of farmers cultivating different crops in the predicted years
Year
Corn Cotton Fallow
Rice Soybeans
2020
1,375
2
10
10
1,175
2021
1,354
4
18
1
1,195
2022
1,379
38
15
12
1,128
Note: This is the result obtained from the random forest choice prediction model. Consistent with the
previous years, the number of farmers cultivating corn and soybean is higher than the other row crops.

Table 4.13. Irrigated area (in acres) allocated under corn, cotton, rice, and soybean in
the study region for the predicted years
Year
Corn
Cotton
Rice
Soybeans
2020 108,383
125
1,010
116,999
2021 105,708
301
18
119,713
2022 107,246 3,578
1,101
114,048
Note: The rising demand for corn and soybean increases the allocated area for three years compared to
other row crops.
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profitability or rising national and international demand for corn and soybean. 26 Corn
and soybean contribute to cellulosic biofuel and biomass-based diesel, respectively.
With the increased volumetric mandate, more farmers would get involved in corn and
soybean farming.
The profits obtained from predicted crop choice at maximum or reduced irrigation
rates when farmers adopt efficient irrigation technologies are given in Table 4.14.
Compared to the no conservation scenario, the 30% reduction rate increases profit by
0.14% within three years. Groundwater conservation also increases the economic life of
the aquifer. However, I do not analyze the environmental benefits of groundwater
conservation in this essay. If farmers continue farming with current inefficient irrigation
technology, the impact of the reduced amount of water would be reflected in total
production (Tables 4.15). When irrigation volume is reduced by 5% from the level that
generates the maximum yield, farmers lose 3% in returns within three years. In the
maximum water saving scenario (30% of the total extraction), the loss would be even
worse.
Table 4.14. Profits obtained from cultivating crops at reduced groundwater irrigation
rates when farmers adopt efficient irrigation technologies.
Policy scenario
2020
2021
2022
Total
No conservation
5% conservation
10% conservation

133.866
133.897
133.928

122.129
122.159
122.189

117.549
117.578
117.607

373.545
373.634
373.724

20% conservation
30% conservation

133.989
134.051

122.248
122.307

117.664
117.722

373.902
374.080

Notes: The cultivation crops for the year 2020-2023 are obtained by the random forest model. Farmers
apply the maximum amount of water required to produce a maximum yield in the no conservation
scenario. In the conservation scenarios, farmers reduce the maximum extraction amount by a given
percentage. Since farmers use efficient irrigation technology, this result is based on an assumption that
they would not bear any yield loss due to water constraint. The values are in million dollars.
26

Domestic demand may come from increased biofuel target volume (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 2015; 2019).
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Table 4.15. Profits obtained from cultivating crops at reduced groundwater irrigation
rates when farmers continue farming with the current inefficient irrigation technologies.
Policy scenario
2020
2021
2022
Total
No conservation
5% conservation
10% conservation
20% conservation
30% conservation

133.866
129.991
125.7718
116.1268
107.8093

122.1293
118.4644
114.5972
105.8212
98.26945

117.5493
114.0802
110.4156
102.042
94.82258

373.5447
362.5356
350.7845
323.99
300.9013

Notes: Crop selected are for the year 2020-2023 and obtained by using a random forest model. Farmers
apply the maximum amount of water required to produce a maximum yield in the no conservation
scenario. In the conservation scenarios, farmers reduce the maximum extraction amount by a given
percentage. Since farmers continue farming with the current inefficient irrigation technology, this result is
based on an assumption that they would bear yield loss due to water constraint. The values are in million
U.S. dollars.

The potential economic impact is different in a fixed cropping pattern (2019’s
status quo) compared to crop rotation. Without changing the cropping pattern, the
adoption of efficient irrigation technology and limiting groundwater extraction by 30%
would increase returns by 0.13% from 2020 to 2022 (Table 4.16). A reduction of 30% in
groundwater extraction without adopting any efficient irrigation technology in the status
quo would decrease returns by 18% (Table 4.17). Inefficient irrigation technology incurs
more loss in crop mix prediction scenarios compared to the status quo (Table 4.18).
Table 4.16. Net present profits from cultivating crops (without crop rotation) at reduced
groundwater irrigation rates when farmers continue farming with the current efficient
irrigation technologies.
Policy scenario
2020
2021
2022
Total
No conservation
5% conservation

118.1495
118.1753

109.5917
109.6166

104.3376
104.3618

332.0788
332.1536

10% conservation
20% conservation
30% conservation

118.2011
118.2526
118.304

109.6415
109.691
109.7405

104.3858
104.4339
104.4818

332.2284
332.3776
332.5264

Notes: The cultivated crops in the years 2020-2023 are the same as in 2019. Farmers apply the
maximum amount of water required to produce a maximum yield in the no conservation scenario. In the
conservation scenarios, farmers reduce the maximum extraction amount by a given percentage. Since
farmers use efficient irrigation technology, this result is based on an assumption that they would not bear
any yield loss due to water constraint. The values are in million dollars.
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Table 4.17. Net present profits from cultivating crops (without crop rotation) at reduced
groundwater irrigation rates when farmers continue farming with the current inefficient
irrigation technologies
Policy scenario
2020
2021
2022
Total
No conservation
5% conservation
10% conservation
20% conservation
30% conservation

118.1495
114.1597
110.7018
102.8638
96.04734

109.5917
105.8279
102.6194
95.37246
89.07113

104.3376
100.7789
97.72732
90.82334
84.81896

332.0788
320.7666
311.0485
289.0596
269.9374

Notes: The cultivation crops for the year 2020-2023 are the continuity of 2019’s crop. Farmers apply the
maximum amount of water required to produce a maximum yield in the no conservation scenario. In the
conservation scenarios, farmers reduce the maximum extraction amount by a given percentage. Since
farmers continue farming with the current inefficient irrigation technology, this result is based on an
assumption that they would bear yield loss due to water constraint. The values are in million dollars.

Table 4.18. Cumulative potential economic impacts of groundwater conservation and
crop-mix in the MRAA at a 30% reduced irrigation rate for 2020-2023.
Policy scenario
Gain in returns (%)
With crop rotation
Efficient irrigation technology
Continuity of current irrigation technology

0.14
-19.45

Without crop rotation
Efficient irrigation technology
Continuity of current irrigation technology

0.13
-18.71

Notes: The crop-mix is predicted by the random forest model. Without crop rotation is 2019’s status quo.
The adoption of efficient irrigation technology does not incur yield loss. Continuity of the current inefficient
technology reduces the yield due to water scarcity. The gain in profits (%) is obtained from comparing the
maximum reduction (30%) with the baseline, no conservation scenario.

My crop choice model shows that farmers will plant more water-intensive crops in the
coming years. Therefore, the loss is higher in more water-intensive cropping if farmers
conserve water without adopting efficient irrigation technology. Policymakers should
consider the potential economic impacts of changing crop-mix while formulating
groundwater conservation policies.
Converting the existing furrow irrigation system to more efficient systems such as
drip irrigation or dropped-nozzle center pivot systems increases farm returns (Evans
and Sadler, 2008). In corn-fields, switching from flooding to subsurface drip irrigation
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reduces the total pumped water volume and increases crop yield (Peterson and Ding,
2005). The water delivery rate at the crop root zone with subsurface and sprinkler
irrigation is substantially higher compared to furrow irrigation. In another study,
Hendricks and Peterson (2012) show that a low drop nozzle compared to furrow
irrigation reduces groundwater use by 2.14 inches per acre. The amount of water
beneficially used by the crop is the same in any irrigation system, although the total
consumptive use of water differs as the irrigation system differs. An efficient irrigation
system reduces the consumptive use of water. As shown in Table 4.2, one of the major
barriers to reducing groundwater use is the installation cost of an efficient irrigation
system that may not offset the benefits from the system. A cost-share program can
contribute to both reducing groundwater extraction and increasing the welfare of
farmers.
4.5. Conclusions
In arid and semi-arid regions, groundwater is the only reliable and comparatively costeffective source of irrigation. Louisiana corn and soybean cultivation are mainly
concentrated in the MRAA region, the ten northeast parishes. Since the MRAA is a
confined aquifer, the cultivation of more water-intensive crops increases the cost of
production and ultimately threatens the economic life of the aquifer. My study
contributes to estimating the potential economic impacts of groundwater conservation
policy or water-saving technology from 2020 to 2022. Most importantly, farmers' crop
planting decisions impact groundwater use. I assume that farmers’ planting decisions
are based on the location, the current year’s total revenue, and the planting decisions
within the last three years. Farmers are profit maximizers but they do not always choose

113

to plant a crop with the highest expected profit. Farm machinery and environmental
factors such as insect and pest severity also determine their planting decisions. In a
rice-soybean production system, farmers generally leave land fallow once every three
years. Based on the historical choice observation, I select the farms that have been
planting any one of the crops from corn, cotton, rice, and soybean or leave land fallow,
making five different choices.
The price of one commodity affects the price of another commodity, and it is
dynamic. I use the VAR model for forecasting agricultural output and energy prices. My
forecasting model shows the dependencies and co-movement within the commodity
price. The results from the forecasting model are used in my choice prediction model to
determine the choice of an individual farmer that may plant from 2020 to 2022. Among
different predicting techniques, random forest performed best, with the highest out of
sample forecasting accuracy percentage.
Farmers would save more energy if they conserved more water, but the ultimate
effect would be in the crop yield. Efficient irrigation technologies do not compromise
crop yield. I estimate the returns from groundwater irrigated land. The results suggest
that farmers increase their returns by adopting efficient irrigation technology even on
restricting groundwater extraction at different rates. The reduction of groundwater use
lowers the crop yield accordingly in the inefficient irrigation system. More waterintensive crops suffer more when water is reduced under an inefficient irrigation system.
There must be some kind of incentive to encourage farmers to adopt water-saving
irrigation technology. However, the adoption of efficient irrigation technology could
impact the intensive and extensive marginal adjustments of the irrigated land.
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In the future, research can be explored to determine the threshold level of water
required for maximum yield in the MRAA region. My methodological tools and findings
are important for policymakers in the evaluation of groundwater conservation policy or
water-saving technology. Since the area allocated under different crops is changing
from 2004 to 2019, the constant acreage allocation under different crops over the study
horizon is the limitation of this study. In the future, I expect to analyze the impact of crop
acreage change on farm returns. Impacts of adoption of drought resistant crops or crop
switching from more water-sensitive crops to less water-sensitive crops on groundwater
conservation and farm profits should be explored. Current studies of the economic
impacts of groundwater conservation mainly center on the pumping cost. Groundwater
exploitation also causes production externality when the well capacity declines and
farmers have to invest in deep well boring to access water.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, I focused on the concerns related to groundwater quantity and
quality in Louisiana, where water is a free good. I wrote this dissertation in a threeessay format.
In the first essay, I surveyed the recent literature related to the development and
improvement of hydro-economic dynamic models and the importance of those models
for groundwater policy evaluation. The water economy is shifting from water supply
infrastructure development to an efficient and optimal allocation. Groundwater
management literature has also morphed to spatial and temporal optimal resource
allocation from the benefit-cost analysis of the water supply development project.
Inappropriate information on aquifer characteristics in decision making may cause
irreversible damage or destabilize an aquifer system. Characteristics of an aquifer such
as, the bathtub or multicell connected or multiple bathtubs, are very crucial to estimate
the unbiased welfare gain and optimal extraction path. Researchers are very concerned
about the nature of aquifers while assessing spatial and temporal welfare impacts
gained from groundwater management policy instruments such as water pricing, water
limit, volumetric restriction, electricity quota, and tradable and capped water permits.
Developing and assessing the impacts of groundwater management policies may face
hydrologic, economic, and institutional barriers. The unavailability of accurate data
related to an invisible water source poses a big challenge in policy evaluation. Similarly,
estimation of water demand, identification of future cropping patterns, and future
input/output prices add complexity. Since knowledge of groundwater is not limited to its
physical properties, a survey of the literature shows the importance of an
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interdisciplinary approach to overcome many hydrological, economic, and institutional
challenges. Future research should continue incorporating more detailed aquifer
characteristics while evaluating institutional regulations. I provided a comprehensive
summary of the literature and pointed out explorable research areas, such as
transboundary groundwater management and conjunctive use of surface and
groundwater in the hydro-economic modeling framework, including more detailed
aquifers’ characteristics.
In the second essay, I evaluated the impacts of groundwater policy instruments
on the optimal extraction path, welfare gain, and well life. Proposed policy instruments
were water quota, well depth limit, and the combined water quota and well depth limit.
MRAA faces a saltwater intrusion problem, upconing from the underlying saltwater
source. The movement of saltwater towards the well screen is directly proportional to
groundwater extraction. I proposed a hydro-economic model to address joint quality and
quantity management issues. My results showed that there is a tradeoff between
groundwater quality and quantity. In a comparison of both myopic behaviors, with and
without saltwater intrusion, the welfare loss from saltwater intrusion over the 100-year
horizon ranges from 14.8% to 32%, which increases with the higher saltwater
concentration of the underlying saltwater source. The optimal extraction path and total
welfare, as an outcome of a quota, are lower than other policy instruments; however,
the quota protects wells from drying out. I also showed the tradeoff between resilience
and economic payoffs. When the saltwater concentration is higher beneath the
freshwater aquifer, the combined quota and well depth limit generates higher benefits,
extracts lower water volume, and reduces the number of dry wells compared to the
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baseline scenario and policy instrument using the well depth limit. I showed the
importance of groundwater management policies in Louisiana to avoid farm loss from
saltwater intrusion. The flexible hydro-economic model developed in this essay can
evaluate different policy instruments designed to improve both groundwater quality and
quantity. However, there are some limitations of this essay, that should be further
explored in the future. I did not consider climate change variability in welfare estimates.
The probabilistic distribution of rainfall, based on the historical observation of
precipitation, can be included in the hydro-economic model. Rainfall, just before the
scheduled irrigation time, would impact total groundwater supply. Moreover, quota
shows a more resilient effect despite the lower welfare gain. The welfare gain under
combined transferable quota and well depth limit could be an explorable research area
in the future.
In essay 3, I examined the potential economic impacts of crop choice and
groundwater conservation. Farmers have five different choices: corn, cotton, rice,
soybean, and fallow. They may rotate crops or leave their land fallow based on the
environmental and agronomic factors. Moreover, the total revenue generated per acre
of irrigated land also affects the crop choice. I use the VAR model to forecast the energy
price and crop output from 2020 to 2022. The forecasted prices of crop outputs, land
parcel location, and historical crop choice from 2004 to 2019 are used as the input in
the machine learning tools. Multinomial logit, random forest, decision tree, and neural
network- multilayer perceptron methods are the machine learning tools that I used in
this essay to predict crop choice for three years. The predicted crop choice and land
acre are used to estimate the total water required for irrigation. Based on the stress that

118

irrigation would create on the aquifer, I obtain the groundwater height from the
groundwater model developed for the MRAA and estimate the energy cost. I define
different scenarios where farmers conserve groundwater by 5%, 10%, 20%, and 30%
and compared them with the baseline scenario (no conservation). I found that 2,572
farmers could increase farm profits by 0.14% within three years with 30% conservation.
This result would inform policymakers that government agencies should encourage
farmers to participate in the cost share program for adopting efficient irrigation
technology. This essay also has a limitation that can be developed as a research
objective. I consider the fixed irrigated area over the three-year horizon. However, the
historical acreage allocation shows that the area under corn and soybean is expanding.
Therefore, the intensive and extensive marginal effect of groundwater use decisions can
be considered in the crop choice modeling framework in future research to estimate the
welfare gain from groundwater conservation.
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